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Abstract
This paper investigates a real-business-cycle economy that features dispersed information
about the underlying aggregate productivity shocks, taste shocks, and—potentially—shocks to
monopoly power. We show how the dispersion of information can (i) contribute to significant
inertia in the response of macroeconomic outcomes to such shocks; (ii) induce a negative short-
run response of employment to productivity shocks; (iii) imply that productivity shocks explain
only a small fraction of high-frequency fluctuations; (iv) contribute to significant noise in the
business cycle; (v) formalize a certain type of demand shocks within an RBC economy; and
(vi) generate cyclical variation in observed Solow residuals and labor wedges. Importantly, none
of these properties requires significant uncertainty about the underlying fundamentals: they
rest on the heterogeneity of information and the strength of trade linkages in the economy, not
the level of uncertainty. Finally, none of these properties are symptoms of inefficiency: apart
from undoing monopoly distortions or providing the agents with more information, no policy
intervention can improve upon the equilibrium allocations.
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1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in macroeconomics, going back to Phelps (1970), Lucas (1972, 1975), Barro
(1976), King (1982), and others, to use information frictions to break the neutrality of monetary
policy. This literature has recently been revived by Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims (2003), Woodford
(2003a, 2008), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008), and others. While this work has proposed new
formalizations of the origins of informational frictions, most of it has remained focused on the old
theme of breaking monetary neutrality. In this paper, we are also concerned with informational
frictions, but shift focus to a very different theme: we study how informational frictions impact the
response of the economy to aggregate productivity shocks, and other real shocks, within the context
of a micro-founded real-business-cycle model.
This shift is motivated by two considerations. First, the empirical relevance of theories that
require significant lack of information, or some type of unawareness, about the current monetary
policy or aggregate prices is questionable. Indeed, the first generation of the aforementioned liter-
ature succumbed to the criticism that such information is widely, readily, and cheaply available.1
Second, we contend that the dispersion of information about the real shocks hitting the economy is
far more severe than the one about the conduct of monetary policy. In the ongoing crisis, for exam-
ple, there is far more uncertainty, and disagreement, about non-monetary factors such as the value
of certain assets, the health of the financial system, or the broader economic fundamentals. And yet,
the pertinent literature has little to say about how the heterogeneity of information about the real
underlying economic fundamentals matters for macroeconomic outcomes. Finally, we would like to
understand not only how this heterogeneity may impact the positive properties of the business cycle
but also its normative properties.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper introduces dispersed information in an otherwise
canonical RBC model, where nominal prices are flexible and monetary factors are irrelevant. We
first show that the dispersion of information can significantly alter certain positive properties of
the RBC paradigm—indeed in ways that might imply that technology shocks explain only a small
fraction of high-frequency business cycles, while at the same time helping overcome certain criticisms
that New-Keynesians have raised against the RBC paradigm. We next show that this significant
1The new generation has attempted to escape this criticism by postulating that, even if such information is readily
and cheaply available, it may still be hard to update one’s information sufficiently frequently (Mankiw and Reis, 2002)
or to process and absorb such information sufficiently well (Woodford, 2003a, 2008; Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2008).
While these ideas are plausible, it seems hard either to gauge their quantitative importance or to reconcile them with
the fact that financial markets respond nearly instantaneously to any news about monetary policy, or that a variety
of economic agents appear to pay close attention to monetary policy.
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change in the positive properties of the RBC paradigm happens without affecting one important
normative lesson: as long as there are no monopoly distortions, the equilibrium allocations coincide
with the solution to a certain planning problem, leaving no room for stabilization policies.
These results should not be interpreted narrowly only as an attack against the New-Keynesian
paradigm. Our primary goal is to provide a clean theoretical benchmark for the positive and
normative implications of dispersed information. Abstracting from nominal frictions best serves
this purpose. And yet, our framework is rich enough to nest the real backbone of New-Keynesian
models. Our framework and results may thus prove equally useful for RBC and New-Keynesian
analysts alike. In this regard, we believe that our paper makes not only a specific contribution into
business-cycle theory but also a broader methodological contribution.
Preview of model. The backbone of our model is a canonical RBC economy. We abstract
from capital to simplify the analysis, but allow for a continuum of differentiated commodities. This
multi-good (or multi-sector) specification serves two purposes. First and foremost, it introduces a
certain type of trade interactions that, as first highlighted in Angeletos and La’O (2009b), play a
crucial role for aggregate fluctuations when, and only when, information is dispersed; this is true
whether each of the goods is produced in a competitive or monopolistic fashion. Second, when
combined with monopoly power, this specification permits us to nest the real backbone of New-
Keynesian models, facilitating a translation of our results to such models.2 Accordingly, while the
core of our analysis focuses on shocks to technology (TFP), in principle we also allow for two other
types of shocks to the fundamentals of the economy: taste shocks (shocks to the disutility of labor),
and mark-up shocks (shocks to the elasticity of demand). However, none of our results rests on the
presence of either monopoly power or these additional shocks.
The only friction featured in our model is that certain economic decisions have to be made
under heterogeneous information about the aggregate shocks hitting the economy. The challenge is
to incorporate this informational friction without an undue sacrifice in either the micro-foundations
or the tractability of the analysis. Towards this goal, we formalize this friction with a certain
geographical segmentation, following similar lines as Lucas (1972), Barro (1976), Townsend (1983),
and Angeletos and La’O (2008, 2009b). In particular, we assume that each period firms and workers
meet in different "islands" and have to make their employment and production decisions while facing
uncertainty about the shocks hitting other islands. At the same time, we assume that consumption
choices take place in a centralized market, where information is homogenous, and that households
are "big families", with fully diversified sources of income. This guarantees that our economy admits
2Indeed, all the results we document in this paper directly extend to a New-Keynesian variant as long as monetary
policy replicates flexible-price allocations, which in certain cases is the optimal thing to do (Angeletos and Lao, 2008).
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a representative consumer and maintains high tractability in analysis despite the fact that some key
economic decisions take place under heterogeneous information.
Positive results. As mentioned, the core of our analysis focuses on the special case where
firms are competitive and the only shocks hitting the fundamentals of the economy are technology
(TFP) shocks which makes the analysis directly comparable to the RBC paradigm.
(i) In standard RBC models (e.g., Hansen, 1985; Prescott, 1986), macroeconomic outcomes
respond fast and strongly to technology shocks. We show that the dispersion of information induces
inertia in the response of macroeconomic outcomes. Perhaps paradoxically, this inertia can be
significant even if the agents face little uncertainty about the underlying shocks.
(ii) Some researchers have argued that employment responds negatively to productivity shocks
in the data; have pointed out that that this fact is inconsistent with standard RBC models; and
have used this fact to argue in favor of New-Keynesian models (e.g., Galí, 1999; Basu, Fernald and
Kimball, 2006; Galí and Rabanal, 2004). Although this fact remains debatable (e.g., Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Vigfusson, 2003; McGrattan, 2004), we show that the dispersion of information
can accommodate it within the RBC paradigm.
(iii) In the RBC paradigm, technology shocks account for the bulk of short-run fluctuations.
Many economists have argued that this is empirically implausible and have favored New-Keynesian
alternatives. We show that the dispersion of information can induce technology shocks to explain
only a small fraction of the high-frequency variation in the business cycle. And yet, the entire
business cycle remains neoclassical in its nature: monetary factors play no role whatsoever.
(iv) What drives the residual variation in short-run fluctuations in our model is simply the
noise in available information, that is, correlated errors in the agents’ expectations of the underlying
technology shocks. Most interestingly, we show that the fraction of short-run volatility that is due
to such noise can be arbitrarily high even if the agents are nearly perfectly informed about the
underlying technology shocks.
(v) These noise-driven fluctuations help formalize a certain type of "demand shocks" within an
RBC setting. The associated errors in forecasting economic activity can be interpreted as variation
in expectations of "aggregate demand". They help increase the relative volatility of employment
while decreasing its correlation with output. An identification strategy as in Blanchard and Quah
(1989) or Galí (1999) would likely identify these shocks as "demand" shocks.
(vi) These noise-driven fluctuations involve countercyclical variation in measured labor wedges,
and procyclical variation in Solow residuals, consistent with what observed in the data. Once again,
these cyclical variations can be significant even if the agents are nearly perfectly informed about
the underlying technology shocks.
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While we stop short of quantifying these results, we hope that they at least highlight how the
heterogeneity of information has a very different mark on macroeconomics outcomes than the un-
certainty about fundamentals—a point that we further elaborate on in Angeletos and La’O (2009b).
Indeed, what drives our results is not per se the level of uncertainty about the underlying technology
or other shocks, but rather the lack of common knowledge about them: our effects are consistent
with an arbitrarily small level of uncertainty about the underlying fundamentals.
At the same time, the lack of common knowledge does not alone explain the magnitude of our
effects. Rather, this depends crucially on the strength of trade linkages among the firms and workers
our economy. This idea is formalized by our game-theoretic representation. A measure of the trade
linkages in our economy, namely the elasticity of substitution across different goods, maps one-to-
one to the degree of strategic complementarity in the game that represents our economy. One can
then extrapolate from earlier more abstract work on games of strategic complementarity (Morris
and Shin, 2002, Angeletos and Pavan, 2007a) that the strength of trade linkages in our economy
may play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium effects of heterogeneous information. We
conclude that our findings hinge on the combination of heterogeneous information with strong trade
linkages—but they do not hinge on the level of uncertainty about the underlying fundamentals.
We finally seek to understand the normative content of the aforementioned findings. We know
that a planner could improve welfare by aggregating the information that is dispersed in the economy,
or otherwise providing the agents with more information. But this provides no guidence on whether
the government should stabilize the fluctuations that originate in noise, or otherwise interfere with
the way the economy responds to available information. To address this issue, one has to ask
whether a planner can improve upon the equilibrium allocations without changing the information
structure.
We show that the answer to this question is essentially negative. In particular, in the special
case of our model where firms are competitive, there is indeed no way in which the planner can
raise welfare without changing the information that is available to the economy. As for the more
general case where firms have monopoly power, the best the planner can do is merely to undo the
monopoly distortion, much alike what he is supposed to do when information is commonly shared.
We conclude that, insofar the information is taken as exogenous, the key normative lessons of the
pertinent business-cycle theory survive the introduction of dispersed information, no matter how
severely the positive lessons might be affected.
Layout. The remainder of the introduction discusses the related literature. Section 2 introduces
the model. Section 3 characterizes the general equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 explore the implications
for business cycles. Section 6 studies efficiency. Section 7 concludes.
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Related literature. The macroeconomics literature on informational frictions has a long his-
tory, a revived present, and—hopefully—a promising future.3 Among this literature, most influential
in our thinking have been Morris and Shin (2002), Woodford (2003a), and Angeletos and Pavan
(2007, 2009). Morris and Shin (2002) were the first to highlight the potential implications of asym-
metric information, and higher-order beliefs, for settings that feature strategic complementarity.
Woodford (2003a) exploited the inertia of higher-order beliefs to generate inertia in the response of
prices to nominal shocks in a stylized model of price setting. Finally, Angeletos and Pavan (2007a,
2009) provided a methodology for studying the positive and normative properties of a more general
class of games with strategic complementarity and dispersed information.
The framework we use in this paper is a variant of the ones we use in two companion papers
for different purposes. In Angeletos and La’O (2009b) we elaborate on the broader insight that the
heterogeneity of information introduces a distinct type of uncertainty about economic activity, and
show how this can sustain sunspot-like fluctuations in a unique-equilibrium economy. In Angeletos
and La’O (2008), on the other hand, we extend the analysis of the present paper by allowing
information to get aggregated through certain price and quantity indicators and by introducing
nominal frictions; we then explore the implications for optimal fiscal and monetary policy.
Part of the combined contribution of these papers is to show how the equilibrium and effi-
cient allocations of fully micro-founded business-cycle economies can be represented as the Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of a game similar to those considered in the more abstract setting of Morris
and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007a, 2009). This representation is useful, as it fa-
cilitates a translation of some of the more abstract insights of this earlier work within the context
of business cycles. At the same time, the specific micro-foundations are crucial for understanding
both the positive and the normative implications of the particular form of complementarity featured
in business-cycle models. Indeed, it is only these micro-foundations that explain either why this
complementarity turns out to be irrelevant when information is commonly shared, or why it has
none of the welfare implications conjectured by Morris and Shin (2002).
Finally, it is worth noting how our approach differs from those of Beaudry and Portier (2004,
2006), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2008), and Lorenzoni (2008). These papers consider certain types of expectations-driven, or noise-
3Recent contributions include Adam (2007), Amador and Weill (2007, 2008), Amato and Shin (2006), Angeletos
and Pavan (2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2009), Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005), Collard and Dellas (2005), Hellwig (2002,
2005), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2008), Hellwig and Venkateswara (2008), Klenow and Willis (2007), Lorenzoni (2008,
2009), Luo (2008), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008, 2009), Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006), Morris and Shin (2002,
2006), Moscarini (2004), Nimark (2008), Reis (2006, 2008), Rodina (2008), Sims (2003, 2006), Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2006), Veldkamp (2006), Veldkamp and Woolfers (2007), and Woodford (2003a, 2008).
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driven, fluctuations. However, these fluctuations originate merely form uncertainty about future
technological opportunities, obtain within representative-agent models, and do not rest on the het-
erogeneity of information. Interestingly, Kydland and Prescott (1982) had also allowed for certain
expectational shocks; but they, too, did not consider heterogeneous information. Similarly, there
are numerous papers that consider geographical and trading structures similar to the one in our
model (e.g., Lucas and Prescott, 1974; Rios-Rull and Prescott, 1992; Alvarez and Shimer, 2008),
but once again rule out heterogeneous information about the aggregate economic fundamentals.
To recap, it is this particular type of informational heterogeneity that is the distinctive feature
of our approach in either the present paper or the aforementioned companion papers. This also
distinguishes our approach from the Mirrless literature, which allows for heterogeneous information
about idiosyncratic shocks but also rules out heterogeneous information about aggregate shocks.
2 The model
There is a (unit-measure) continuum of households, or “families”, each consisting of a consumer and
a continuum of workers. There is a continuum of “islands”, which define the boundaries of local
labor markets as well as the “geography” of information: information is symmetric within an island,
but asymmetric across islands. Each island is inhabited by a continuum of firms, which specialize
in the production of differentiated commodities. Households are indexed by h ∈ H = [0, 1]; islands
by i ∈ I = [0, 1]; firms and commodities by (i, j) ∈ I × J ; and periods by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}.
Each period has two stages. In stage 1, each household sends a worker to each of the islands.
Local labor markets then open, workers decide how much labor to supply, firms decide how much
labor to demand, and local wages adjust so as to clear the local labor market. At this point,
workers and firms in each island have perfect information regarding local productivity, but imperfect
information regarding the productivities in other islands. After employment and production choices
are sunk, workers return home and the economy transits to stage 2. At this point, all information
that was previously dispersed becomes publicly known, and commodity markets open. Quantities
are now pre-determined by the exogenous productivities and the endogenous employment choices
made during stage 1, but prices adjust so as to clear product markets.
Households. The utility of household h is given by
ui =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(Ch,t)−
∫
I
Si,tV (nhi,t)di,
]
with
U(C) =
C1−γ
1− γ and V (n) =
n1+
1 + 
.
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Here, γ ≥ 0 parametrizes the income elasticity of labor supply,4  ≥ 0 parameterizes the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, nhi,t is the labor of the worker who gets located on island i during stage
1 of period t, Sh,t is an island-specific shock to the disutility of labor, and Ch,t is a composite of all
the commodities that the household purchases and consumes during stage 2.
This composite, which also defines the numeraire used for wages and commodity prices, is given
by the following nested CES structure:
Ch,t =
[∫
I
c
ρ−1
ρ
hi,t di
] ρ
ρ−1
where
chi,t =
[∫
J
c
ηit−1
ηit
hij,t dj
] ηit
ηit−1
and where chij,t is the quantity household h consumes in period t of the commodity produced by firm
j on island i. Here, ηit is a random variable that determines the period-t elasticity of demand faced
by any individual firm within a given island i, while ρ is the elasticity of substitution across different
islands. Letting the within-island elasticity η differ from the across-islands elasticity ρ permits us to
distinguish the degree of monopoly power (which will be determined by the former) from the strength
of trade linkages and the associated degree of strategic complementarity (which will be determined
by the latter). In fact, a case of special interest that we will concentrate on for much of our analysis
is the limit where monopoly power vanishes (η →∞) while the strategic complementarity remains
non-trivial (ρ < ∞); this case nests a canonical, competitive RBC economy. At the same time,
letting the within-island elasticity to be finite and random permits us to introduce monopoly power
and mark-up shocks, thus facilitating a translation/extension of our results to the New-Keynesian
framework.
Households own equal shares of all firms in the economy. The budget constraint of household h
is thus given by the following:∫
I×J
pij,tchij,td(j, k) +Bh,t+1 ≤
∫
J×I
piij,td(i, j) +
∫
I
witnhi,tdk +RtBh,t,
where pij,t is the period-t price of the commodity produced by firm j on island i, piij,t is the period-t
profit of that firm, wit is the period-t wage on island i, Rt is the period-t nominal gross rate of
return on the riskless bond, and Bh,t is the amount of bonds held in period t.
The objective of each household is simply to maximize expected utility subject to the budget
and informational constraints faced by its members. Here, one should think of the worker-members
4Note that risk aversion and intertemporal substitution play no role in our setting because all idiosyncratic risk is
insurable and there is no capital. Therefore, γ only controls the sensitivity of labor supply to income for given wage.
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of each family as solving a team problem: they share the same objective (family utility) but have
different information sets when making their labor-supply choices. Formally, the household sends
off during stage 1 its workers to different islands with bidding instructions on how to supply labor as
a function of (i) the information that will be available to them at that stage and (ii) the wage that
will prevail in their local labor market. In stage 2, the consumer-member collects all the income
that the worker-member has collected and decides how much to consume in each of the commodities
and how much to save (or borrow) in the riskless bond.
Asset markets. Asset markets operate in stage 2, along with commodity markets, when all
information is commonly shared. This guarantees that asset prices do not convey any information.
The sole role of the bond market in the model is then to price the risk-free rate. Moreover, because
our economy admits a representative consumer, allowing households to trade risky assets in stage 2
would not affect any of the results.
Firms. The output of firm j on island i during period t is given by
qij,t = Ai,t(nij,t)θ
where Ai,t is the productivity in island i, nij,t is the firm’s employment, and θ ∈ (0, 1) parameterizes
the degree of diminishing returns in production. The firm’s realized profit is given by
piij,t = pij,tqij,t − wi,tnij,t
Finally, the objective of the firm is to maximize its expectation of the representative consumer’s
valuation of its profit, namely, its expectation of U ′(Ct)piij,t.
Labor and product markets. Labor markets operate in stage 1, while product markets
operate in stage 2. Because labor cannot move across islands, the clearing conditions for labor
markets are as follows: ∫
J
nij,tdj =
∫
H
nhi,tdh ∀i
On the other hand, because commodities are traded beyond the geographical boundaries of islands,
the clearing conditions for the product markets are as follows:∫
H
chij,tdh = qij,t ∀(i, j)
Fundamentals and information. Each island in our economy is subject to three types of
shocks: shocks to the technology used by local firms (TFP shocks); shocks to the disutility of labor
faced by local workers (taste shocks); and shocks to the elasticity of demand faced by local firms,
causing variation in their monopoly power (mark-up shocks). We allow for both aggregate and
idiosyncratic components to these shocks.
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The aggregate fundamentals of the economy in period t are identified by the joint distribution
of the shocks (Ait, Sit, ηit) in the cross-section of islands.5 Let Ψt denote this distribution. The
standard practice in macroeconomics is to assume that Ψt is commonly known in the beginning of
period t. In contrast, we consider situations where information about Ψt is imperfect and, most
importantly, heterogeneous. We thus assume that different islands observe only noisy private (local)
signals about Ψt in stage 1, when they have to make their decentralized employment and production
choices. On the other hand, we assume that Ψt becomes common known in stage 2, when agents
meet in the centralized commodity and financial markets.
For our main theoretical results we do not need to make any special assumptions about the
information that is available to each island. For example, we can impose a Gaussian structure as
in Morris and Shin (2002). Alternatively, we could allow some islands to be perfectly informed
and others to be imperfectly informed, mimicking the idea in Mankiw and Reis (2002) that only
a fraction of the agents update their information sets in any given point of time. To some extent,
we could even interpret the noise in these signals as the product of rational inattention, as in Sims
(2003) and Woodford (2003a). More generally, we do not expect the details of the origins of noise
to be crucial for our positive results.
We thus start by allowing a rather arbitrary information structure, as in the more abstract work
of Angeletos and Pavan (2009). First, we let ωt denote the "type" of an island during period t.
This variable encodes all the information available to an island about the local shocks as well as
about the cross-sectional distribution of shocks and information in the economy. Next, we let Ωt
denote the distribution of ωt in the cross-section of islands. This variable identifies the aggregate
state of the economy during period t; note that the aggregate state now includes not only the cross-
sectional distribution Ψt of the shocks but also the cross-sectional distributions of the information
(signals). Finally, we let Sω denote the set of possible types for each island, SΩ the set of probability
distributions over Sω, and P(·|·) a probability measure over S2Ω.6
We then formalize the information structure as follows. In the beginning of period t, and
conditional on Ωt−1, Nature draws a distribution Ωt ∈ SΩ using the measure P(Ωt|Ωt−1).7 Nature
then uses Ωt to make independent draws of ωt ∈ Sω, one for each island. In the beginning of period
t, before they make their current-period employment and production choices, agents in any given
5In special cases (as with Assumption 1 later on), this distribution might be conveniently parameterized by the
mean values of the shocks; but in general the aggregate fundamentals are identified by the entire distribution.
6To avoid getting distracted by purely technical issues, our proofs treat Sω and SΩ as if they were finite sets.
However, none of our results hinges on this restriction.
7Note that we have imposed that the aggregate state Ωt follows a Markov process; apart from complicating the
notation, nothing changes if we let the aforementioned probability measure depend on all past aggregate states.
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island get to see only their own ωt; in general, this informs them perfectly about their local shocks,
but only imperfectly about the underlying aggregate state Ωt. In the end of the period, however,
Ωt becomes commonly known (ensuring that Ψt also becomes commonly known).
To recap, the key informational friction in our model is that agents face uncertainty about
the underlying aggregate state Ωt. Whether they face uncertainty about their own local shocks is
immaterial for the type of effects we analyze in this paper. Merely for convenience, then, we assume
that the agents of an island learn their own local shocks in stage 1. We can thus express the shocks
as functions of ωt: we denote with A(ωt) the local productivity shock, with S(ωt) the local taste
shock, and with η(ωt) the local mark-up shock.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium by providing a game-theoretic representation that
turns out to be instrumental for our subsequent analysis.
3.1 Definition
Because each family sends workers to every island and receives profits from every firm in the economy,
each family’s income is fully diversified during stage 2. This guarantees that our model admits a
representative consumer and that no trading takes place in the financial market. To simplify the
exposition, we thus set Bt = 0 and abstract from the financial market. Furthermore, because
of the symmetry of preferences, technologies and information within each island, it is without
any loss of generality to impose symmetry in the choices of workers and firms within each island.
Finally, because of the absence of capital and the Markov restriction on the aggregate state, Ωt−1
summarizes all the payoff-relevant public information as of the beginning of period t. Recall then
that the additional information that becomes available to an island in stage 1 is only ωt. As a result,
the local levels of labor supply, labor demand, wage, and output can all depend on Ωt−1 and ωt,
but not the current aggregate state Ωt. On the other hand, the commodity prices in stage 2, and
all aggregate outcomes, do depend on Ωt. We thus define an equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of an employment strategy n : Sω × SΩ → R+ a production
strategy q : Sω × SΩ → R+, a wage function w : Sω × SΩ → R+, an aggregate output function
Q : S2Ω → R+, an aggregate employment function N : S2Ω → R+, a price function p : Sω×S2Ω → R+,
and a consumption strategy c : R3+ → R+, such that the following are true:
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(i) The price function is normalized so that
P (Ωt,Ωt−1) ≡
[∫
p(ω,Ωt,Ωt−1)1−ρdΩt(ω)
] 1
1−ρ
= 1
for all (Ωt,Ωt−1).
(ii) The quantity c(p, p′, Q) is the representative consumer’s optimal demand for any commodity
whose price is p when the price of all other commodities from the same island is p′ and the aggregate
output (income) is Q.
(iii) When the current aggregate state is Ωt and the past aggregate state is Ωt−1, the price that
clears the market for the product of the typical firm from island ωt is p(ωt,Ωt,Ωt−1); the employment
and output levels of that firm are, respectively, n(ωt,Ωt−1) and q(ωt,Ωt−1), with q(ωt,Ωt−1) =
A(ωt)n(ωt,Ωt−1)θ ; and the aggregate output and employment indices are, respectively,
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) =
{∫
q(ω,Ωt−1)
ρ−1
ρ dΩt(ω)
} ρ
ρ−1
and N(Ωt,Ωt−1) =
∫
n(ω,Ωt−1)dΩt(ω).
(iv) The quantities n(ωt,Ωt−1) and q(ωt,Ωt−1) are optimal from the perspective of the typical
firm in island ωt, taking into account that firms in other islands are behaving according to the same
strategies, that the local wage is given by w(ωt,Ωt−1), that prices will be determined in stage 2 so as
to clear all product markets, that the representative consumer will behave according to consumption
strategy c, and that aggregate income will be given by Q(Ωt,Ωt−1).
(v) The local wage w(ωt,Ωt−1) is such that the quantity n(ωt,Ωt−1) is also the optimal labor
supply of the typical worker in an island of type ωt.
Note that condition (i) simply means that the numeraire for our economy is the CES composite
defined when we introduced preferences. The rest of the conditions then represent a hybrid of a
Walrasian equilibrium for the complete-information exchange economy that obtains in stage 2, once
production choices are fixed, and a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the incomplete-information
game played among different islands in stage 1.
Let us expand on what we mean by this. When firms in an island decide how much labor to
employ and how much to produce during stage 1, they face uncertainty about the prices at which
they will sell their product during stage 2 and hence they face uncertainty about the marginal
return to labor. Similarly, when workers in an island decide how much labor to supply, they face
uncertainty about the real income their household will have in stage 2 and hence face uncertainty
about the marginal value of the wealth that they can generate by working more. But then note that
firms and workers in each island can anticipate that the prices that clear the commodity markets
and the realized level of real income are, in equilibrium, determined by the level of employment
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and production in other islands. This suggests that we can solve for the general equilibrium of the
economy by reducing it to a certain game, where the incentives of firms and workers in an island
depend on their expectations of the choices of firms and workers in other islands. We implement
this solution strategy in the following.
Remark. To simplify notation, we often use qit as a short-cut for q(ωt,Ωt−1), Qt as a short-cut
for Q(Ωt,Ωt−1), Eit as a short-cut for E[·|ωt,Ωt−1], and so on; also, we drop the indices h and j,
because we know that allocations are identical across households, or across firms within an island.
3.2 Characterization
Towards solving for the equilibrium, consider first how the economy behaves in stage 2. The optimal
demand of the representative consumer for a commodity from island i whose price is pit when the
price of other commodities in the same island is p′it is given by the following:
cit =
(
pit
p′it
)−ηit (p′it
Pt
)−ρ
Ct,
where Pt = 1 by our choice of numeraire.8 In equilibrium, Ct = Qt. It follows that the equilibrium
consumption strategy is given by c(p, p′, Q) = p−η (p′)η−ρQ. Equivalently, the inverse demand
function faced by a firm during period t is
pit = (p′it)
1− ρ
ηit q
− 1
ηit
it Q
1
ηt
t (1)
Consider now stage 1. Given that the marginal value of nominal income for the representative
household is U ′(Ct) and that Ct = Qt in equilibrium, the objective of the firm is simply
Eit
[
U ′ (Qt) (pitqit − witnit)
]
.
Using (1), we conclude the typical firm on island ωt maximizes the following objective:
Eit
[
U ′ (Qt)
(
(p′it)
1− ρ
ηitQ
1
ηit
t q
1− 1
ηit
it − witnit
)]
, (2)
where qit = Aitnθit. As long as 1 > (1 − 1ηt )θ > 0 (which we assume to be always the case),
the above objective is a strictly concave function of nt, which guarantees that the solution to the
firm’s problem is unique and that the corresponding first-order condition is both necessary and
sufficient. This condition is simply given by equating the expected marginal cost and revenue of
8To understand this condition, note that c′it =
“
p′it
Pt
”−ρ
Ct is the demand for the busket of commodities produced
by a particular island; the demand for the commodity of a particular firm in that islands is then cit =
“
pit
p′it
”−ηi
c′it.
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labor, evaluated under local expectation of the equilibrium pricing kernel:
Eit
[
U ′(Qit)
]
wit =
(
ηit − 1
ηit
)
Eit
[
U ′ (Qt) (p′it)
1− ρ
ηit
(
Qt
qit
) 1
ηit
](
θAitn
θ−1
it
)
. (3)
Next, note that, since all firms within an island set the same price in equilibrium, it must be that
p′it = pit. Along with (1), this gives
p′it = pit =
(
qit
Qt
)− 1
ρ
. (4)
This simply states that the equilibrium price of the typical commodity of an island relative to the
numeraire is equal to the MRS between that commodity and the numeraire. Finally, note that the
optimal labor supply of the typical worker on island i is given by equating the local wage with the
MRS between the numeraire and leisure:
wit =
Sitn

it
Eit [U ′(Qt)]
(5)
Conditions (4) and (5) give the equilibrium prices and wages as functions of the equilibrium allo-
cation. Using these conditions into condition (3), we conclude that the equilibrium allocation is
pinned down by the following condition:
Sitn

it =
(
ηit − 1
ηit
)
Eit
[
U ′ (Qt)
(
qit
Qt
)− 1
ρ
](
θAitn
θ−1
it
)
. (6)
This condition has a simple interpretation: it equates the private cost and benefit of effort in each
island. To see this, note that the left-hand side is simply the marginal disutility of an extra unit of
labor in island i; as for the right-hand side, ηit−1ηit is the reciprocal of the local monopolistic mark-up,
U ′ (Qt)
(
qit
Qt
)− 1
ρ is the marginal utility of an extra unit of the typical local commodity, and θAitnθ−1it
is the corresponding marginal product of labor.
Note that condition (6) expresses the equilibrium levels of local employment nit and local output
qit in relation to the local shocks and the local expectations of aggregate output Qt. Using the
production function, qit = Aitnθit, to eliminate nit in this condition, and reverting to the more
precise notation of Definition 1 (i.e., replacing qit with q(ωt,Ωt−1), Qt with Q(Ωt,Ωt−1), Ait with
A(ωt), and so on), we reach the following result.
Proposition 1. Let
f(ω) ≡ log
{
θ
θ
1−θ++γθ
(
η(ω)− 1
η(ω)
) θ
1−θ++γθ
S(ω)−
θ
1−θ++γθA(ω)
1+
1−θ++γθ
}
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be a composite of all the local shocks hitting an island of type ω and define the coefficient
α ≡
1
ρ − γ
1
ρ +
1−θ+
θ
< 1
The equilibrium levels of local and aggregate output are the solution to the following fixed-point
problem:
log q (ωt,Ωt−1) = (1− α) f(ωt) + α log
{
E
[
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1)
1
ρ
−γ
∣∣∣ωt,Ωt−1] 11ρ−γ} ∀(ωt,Ωt−1) (7)
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) =
[∫
q(ω,Ωt−1)
ρ−1
ρ dΩt(ω)
] ρ
ρ−1
∀(Ωt,Ωt−1). (8)
This result establishes that the general equilibrium of our economy reduces to a simple fixed-point
relation between local and aggregate output. In so doing, it offers a game-theoretic representation
of our economy, similar to the one established in Angeletos and La’O (2009b) for a variant economy
with capital. To see this, consider a game with a large number of players, each choosing an action
in R+. Identify a “player” in this game with an island in our economy and interpret the level of
output of that island as the “action” of the corresponding player. Next, identify the “types” of these
players with ωt, which encodes the local shocks and local information sets in our economy. Finally,
let their “best responses” be given by condition (7). It is then evident that the Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of this game identifies the general equilibrium of our economy.
Note then that the variable f(ωt) conveniently summarizes all the local economic fundamentals,
while the coefficient α identifies the degree of strategic complementarity in our economy. To see
this more clearly, consider a log-linear approximation to conditions (7) and (8):
log qit = const+ (1− α) fit + αEit [logQt] , (9)
logQt = const+
∫
log qitdi, (10)
where const capture second- and higher-order terms.9 It is then evident that the coefficient α
identifies the slope of an island’s best response to the activity of other islands—which is the standard
definition of the degree of strategic complementarity.
Finally, note that Proposition 1 holds no matter the information structure. This is important.
While much of the recent literature has focused on specific formalizations of the information struc-
ture (e.g. Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003a), our result indicates that the
9In general, these second- and higher-order terms may depend on the underlying state and the above is only an
approximation. However, when the underlying shocks and signals are jointly log-normal with fixed second moments
(as imposed by Assumption 1 in the next section), these terms are invariant, the approximation error vanishes, and
conditions (9) and (10) are exact.
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information structure typically matters only by pinning down the agents’ forecasts of economic
activity. We would thus invite future researchers to pay more attention on the theoretical and
empirical properties of these forecasts as opposed to the details of the information structure.
3.3 Trade links and strategic complementarity
As evident from Proposition 1, the degree of complementarity, α, is a monotone function of the
elasticity of substitution across the commodities of different islands, ρ. In what follows, we adopt
the convention that variation in α represents variation in ρ for given other parameters. We also
interpret α as a measure of the strength of trade linkages in our economy. These choices are
motivated by the following observations. First, if we consider a variant of our model where each
household lives and works only in one island and consumes only the products of that island, then
Proposition 1 holds with α = 0; in this sense, it is precisely the trade linkages across different
islands that introduces strategic interdependence (α 6= 0). Second, while α depends, not only on
ρ, but also on , γ, and θ, these other parameters affect the composite shock f and matter for
equilibrium allocations whether islands (agents) are linked or not; in contrast, ρ affects only α. For
these reasons, we henceforth use the notions of strategic complementarity, elasticity of substitution
across islands, and strength of trade linkages, as synonymous to one another. However, we also note
that strong complementarity in our model does not strictly require low ρ: if the wealth effect of
labor supply is small (γ → 0), the Frisch elasticity is high (→ 0), and production is nearly linear
(θ → 1), then the degree of complementarity is high (α→ 1) no matter what ρ is.
The insight that trade introduces a form of strategic complementarity even in neoclassical,
perfectly-competively settings is likely to extend well beyond the boundaries of the model we have
considered here or the variant in Angeletos and La’O (2009b). We believe that this insight has been
under-appreciated in prior work on business cycles for two reasons. First, the two welfare theorems
have thought us that it rarely helps, and it can often be misleading, to think of Walrasian settings
as games. And second, the type of strategic complementarity we highlight here is simply irrelevant
for the business cycle when information is commonly shared.
To understand what we mean by the last point, consider the response of the economy to a
symmetric aggregate shock (i.e., a shock that keeps the level of heterogeneity invariant). Formally,
let f¯t denote the cross-sectional average of the composite fundamental fit and consider any shock
that varies the average fundamental, f¯t, without varying the cross-sectional distribution of the
idiosyncratic components of the fundamentals, ξit ≡ fit − f¯t. When all information is commonly
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shared, aggregate output is also commonly known in equilibrium. Condition (7) then reduces to
log qit = (1− α)(f¯t + ξit) + α logQt. (11)
It is then immediate that the entire cross-sectional distribution of log qit moves one-to-one with f¯t,
which establishes the following.
Proposition 2. Suppose that information is commonly shared and that the level of heterogeneity is
invariant. Then the equilibrium levels of aggregate output is given by
logQt = const+ f¯t.
Recall that, by its definition, the composite shock depends on  and γ but not on ρ. It is then
evident that the response of the economy to the underlying aggregate productivity, taste, or mark-
up shocks is independent of ρ. In this sense, the business cycle is indeed independent of the degree
of strategic complementarity that is induced by trade.
The intuition behind this result is further explained in Angeletos and La’O (2009b). The key
is that the strength of trade linkages matters only for how much agents care about forecasting
the level of economic activity relatively to forecasting the underlying economic fundamentals. But
when information is symmetric (commonly shared), any uncertainty the agents face about the level
of economic activity reduces to the one that they face about the underlying economic fundamentals,
which renders the degree of strategic complementarity irrelevant. In contrast, when information is
asymmetric (dispersed), agents can face additional uncertainty about the level of economic activity,
beyond the one they face about the fundamentals. The strength of trade linkages then dictates
precisely the impact on equilibrium outcome of this residual uncertainty about economic activity.
This is important. It is precisely the aforementioned property that makes dispersed information
distinct from uncertainty about the fundamentals—for it is only the heterogeneity of information
that breaks the coincidence of forecasts of economic activity with the forecasts of the underlying
fundamentals when the equilibrium is unique. We further elaborate on this point in Angeletos and
La’O (2009b), showing how dispersed information can open the door to a certain type of sunspot-like
fluctuations. We refer the reader to that paper for a more thorough discussion of this important,
broader insight. In what follows, we concentrate on how this broader insight helps understand why
the combination of dispersed information with the aforementioned type of complementarity can
have a significant impact on the positive properties of the RBC paradigm.
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3.4 Relation to complementarity in New-Keynesian models
The familiar condition that characterizes optimal target prices in the New-Keynesian paradigm
(e.g., Woodford, 2003b) looks like the following:
pi,t = (1− ξ)Yt + ξpt + zi,t, (12)
where pi,t is the target price of a firm (in logs), Yt is nominal GDP, pt is the aggregate price level,
zi,t captures idiosyncratic productivity or demand shocks, and ξ is a coefficient that is interpreted
as the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions. If we compare the above condition
with condition (9) in our model, the resemblance is striking. The only noticeable difference seems
to be that the relevant choice variable is a price in the New-Keynesian model, while it is a quantity
in our model. However, there are some crucial differences behind this resemblance.
First, condition (12) does not alone pin down the equilibrium. Rather, it must be combined with
other conditions regarding the determination of Yt, the nominal GDP level. In contrast, condition
(9) offers a complete, self-contained, representation of the equilibrium in our model.
Second, the endogeneity of Yt undermines the meaning of condition (12). For example, letting yt
denote real GDP and using Yt = pt+yt, condition (12) can also be restated as pi,t = pt+(1−ξ)yt+zi,t;
but then the degree of complementarity appears to be 1, not ξ. In fact, this alternative representation
is more informative when money is neutral, because yt is then exogenous to nominal factors and this
condition determines only relative prices. But even when money is non-neutral, ξ fails to identify the
degree of complementarity in pricing decisions simply because nominal GDP is far from exogenous—
at the very least because monetary policy responds to variation in pt and yt. Once this endogeneity
is incorporated, the complementarity in pricing decisions is different from ξ and becomes sensitive
to policy parameters. In contrast, in our model the degree of strategic complementarity is pinned
down only by preferences and technologies, and is completely invariant to monetary policy.
Third, the comparative statics of the complementarity in our model (α) with respect to deeper
preference and technology parameters are different from those of its New-Keynesian counterpart (ξ).
In particular, note that α decreases with ρ (the elasticity of substitution across different goods),
decreases with  (the inverse of the Firsch elasticity of labor supply), and increases with θ (the degree
of diminishing returns to labor). Hence, what contributes to strong complementarity in our model is
low substitutability in the commodity side, so that trade is crucial, along with high substitutability
in the labor and production side, as in Hansen (1986) and King and Rebelo (2000). As one of our
discussants highlighted, the opposite comparative statics hold for ξ in the New-Keynesian paradigm.
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that our notion of complementarity may have little
to do with either the degree of monopoly power or the price elasticities of individual demands. In
17
our model, that latter are pinned down by η (the within-island elasticity of substitution), while the
degree of strategic complementarity is pined down by ρ (the across-island elasticity).
Last, but not least, the complementarity highlighted in the New-Keyenesian framework would
vanish if firms were setting real (indexed) prices. In this sense, the New-Keyenesian complementarity
in is a nominal phenomenon, whereas ours is a real phenomenon.
4 Dispersed information and the business cycle
In this section we seek to illustrate how the introduction of dispersed information can impact the
positive properties of the RBC paradigm. To facilitate this task, we impose a Gaussian specification
on the shocks and the information structure, similar to the one in Morris and Shin (2002), Woodford
(2003a), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), and many others.
Assumption 1. The shocks and the available information satisfy the following properties:
(i) The aggregate shock f¯t follows a Gaussian AR(1) or random walk process:
f¯t = ψf¯t−1 + νt,
where ψ parameterizes the persistence of the composite shock and νt is a Normal innovation, with
mean 0 and variance σ2ν ≡ 1/κf , i.i.d. over time.
(ii) The local shock ft is given by
ft = f¯it + ξit,
where ξit is a purely idiosyncratic shock, Normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ξ ,
orthogonal to f¯t, and i.i.d. across islands.
(iii) The private information of an island about the aggregate shock f¯t is summarized in a Gaus-
sian sufficient statistic xit such that
xit = f¯t + ςit,
where ςit is noise, Normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2x ≡ 1/κx, orthogonal to both
f¯t and ξit, and i.i.d. across islands.10
(iv) The public information about the aggregate shock f¯t is summarized in a Gaussian sufficient
statistic yt such that
yt = f¯t + εt,
where εt is noise, Normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ε ≡ 1/κy, and orthogonal to
all other variables.
10Note that the local fundamental fit is itself a private signal of f¯t. However, by the fact that we define xit as a
sufficient statistic of all the local private information, the informational content of fit is already included in xit.
18
This specification imposes a certain correlation in the underlying productivity, taste and mark-
up shocks: for the composite shock fit to follow a univariate process as above, it must be that all the
three type of shocks are moved by a single underlying factor. However, this is only for expositional
simplicity. We can easily extend our results to a situation where each of the shocks follows an
independent Gaussian process, or consider a more general correlation structure among the shocks.
4.1 Closed-form solution
Under Assumption 1, we can identify ωt with the vector (ft, xt, yt). Because Ωt is then a joint
normal distribution with mean (f¯t, f¯t, yt) and an invariant variance-autocovariance matrix, we can
also reduce the aggregate state variable from Ωt to the more convenient vector (f¯t, yt). Next, we
can guess and verify that there is always an equilibrium in which log qit is linear in (f¯t−1, fit, xit, yt)
and logQt is linear in (f¯t−1, f¯t, yt). We then find the coefficients of these linear functions by the
familiar method of undetermined coefficients. Finally, we can use an independent argument to rule
out any other equilibrium. We thereby reach the following result.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium level of local output is given by
log qit = const+ ϕ−1f¯t−1 + ϕffit + ϕxxit + ϕyyt, (13)
where the coefficients (ϕ−1, ϕf , ϕx, ϕy) are given by
ϕ−1 =
{
κf
(1− α)κx + κy + κf
}
αψ ϕf = (1− α)
ϕx =
{
(1− α)κx
(1− α)κx + κy + κf
}
α ϕy =
{
κy
(1− α)κx + κy + κf
}
α (14)
This result gives a closed-form solution of the equilibrium level of output in each island as
a log-linear function of the past aggregate fundamental f¯t−1, the current local fundamental fit,
the local (private) signal xit, and the public signal yt. Note then that the equilibrium level of
output is necessarily an increasing function of the local fundamental fit: ϕf > 0 necessarily. To
interpret this sign, note that higher f means a higher productivity, a lower disutility of labor, or
a lower monopolistic distortion. But whether and how local output depends on f¯t−1, xit and yt is
determined by the degree of strategic complementarity α.
To understand this, note that local output depends on these variables only because these vari-
ables contain information about the current aggregate shocks and, in so doing, help agents forecast
the aggregate level of output. But when α = 0, the demand- and supply side effects that we discussed
earlier perfectly offset each other, so that at the end economic decisions are not interdependent:
local incentives depend only the local fundamentals and not on expectations of aggregate activity.
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It follows that the dependence of local output to f¯t−1, xit and yt vanishes when α = 0. On the other
hand, if α 6= 0, local output depends on f¯t−1, xit and yt because, and only because, these variables
help predict aggregate output. In particular, when economic decisions are strategic complements
(α > 0), the equilibrium level of output in each island responds positively to expectations of aggre-
gate output; in this case, the coefficients ϕ−1, ϕx, and ϕy are all positive. When instead economic
decisions are strategic substitutes (α > 0), the equilibrium level of output in each island responds
negatively to expectations of aggregate output; in this case, the coefficients ϕ−1, ϕx, and ϕy are all
negative. As mentioned earlier, we view the case in which α > 0, and hence in which economic
activity responds positively to good news about aggregate fundamentals, as the empirically most
relevant scenario. For this reason, our subsequent discussion will focus on this case; however, our
results apply more generally.
4.2 Remark on interpretation of noise and comparative statics
Before we proceed, we would like to emphasize that one should not give a narrow interpretation to
the signal yt, or its noise εt. This signal is not meant to capture only purely public information;
rather, it is a convenient modeling device for introducing correlated errors in beliefs of aggregate
fundamentals. Indeed, the results we document below can easily be re-casted with a more general
information structure, one that allows agents to observe multiple private signals and introduce
imperfect cross-sectional correlation in the errors of these private signals; the origin of noise, then,
is not only the public signal, but also the correlated errors in the private signals of the agents. We
invite the reader to keep this more general interpretation of what "noise" stands for in our model:
it is a acronym for all sources of correlated errors in expectations of the fundamentals.11
Similarly, we would like to warn the reader not to focus on the comparative statics of the
equilibrium with respect to the precisions of private and public information, κx and κy, as one of our
discussants suggests. These comparative statics fail to isolate the distinct impact of the heterogeneity
of information, simply because they confound a change in the heterogeneity of information with a
change in the overall precision of information.12 Furthermore, if we had allowed for multiple private
signals with correlated errors, it would be unclear whether an increase in the precision of a certain
11In fact, one could go further and interpret "noise" as a certain type of sentiment shocks, namely shocks that
do not move at all the agents’ beliefs about the fundamentals and nevertheless move equilibrium outcomes. With
a unique-equilibrium model as ours, such shocks cannot exist when information is commonly shared; but emerge
robustly once information is dispersed. See Angeletos and La’O (2009b).
12For example, an increase in κx would increase the heterogeneity of information, but would also increase the overall
precision of information; and while the former effect would tend to amplify the volatility effects we have documented
here, the latter effect would work in the opposite direction.
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signal raises or reduces the heterogeneity of information. With this in mind, in what follows we focus
on the comparative statics with respect to α. These comparative statics best isolate the distinct
role of dispersed information, simply because the degree of complementarity matters for aggregate
fluctuations in our model only by regulating the impact of the heterogeneity of information.13
4.3 Macroeconomic responses to fundamentals and noise
We now study how the dispersion of information and the strength of trade linkages affect aggregate
fluctuations. Towards this goal, we aggregate condition (13) and use the fact that f¯t = ψf¯t−1 + νt
to obtain the following characterization of aggregate output.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium level of aggregate output is given by
logQt = const+ ψf¯t−1 + ϕννt + ϕεεt, (15)
where
ϕν ≡ ϕf + ϕx + ϕy = 1− ακf(1− α)κx + κy + κf and ϕε ≡ ϕy =
ακy
(1− α)κx + κy + κf , (16)
and where νt = f¯t − ψf¯t−1 is the innovation in the fundamentals, ψ is the persistence in the
fundamentals, εt = yt − f¯t is the aggregate noise.
Condition (15) gives the equilibrium level of aggregate output as a log-linear function of the
past aggregate fundamentals, f¯t−1, the current innovation in the fundamentals, νt, and the current
noise, εt. Consider the impact effect of an innovation in fundamentals. This effect is measured
by the coefficient ϕν . Because the latter is a decreasing function of the precisions κx and κy, we
have that the impact effect of an innovation in fundamentals decreases with the level of noise.
This is essentially the same insight as the one that drives the real effects of monetary shocks in
both the older macro models with informational frictions (e.g., Lucas, 1972; Barro, 1976) and their
recent descendants (e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2002): the less informed economic agents are about the
underlying shocks, the less they respond to these shocks. Clearly, this is true no matter whether
agents interact with one another—it is true even in a single-agent decision problem.
13Angeletos and Pavan (2007a) propose that a good measure of the "commonality" of information (an inverse
measure of the heterogeneity of information) is the cross-sectional correlation of the errors in the agents’ forecasts of
the fundamentals: holding constant the variance of these forecast errors, an increase in the correlation implies that
agents can better forecast one another’s actions, even though they cannot better forecast the fundamentals. Following
this alternative route would deliver similar insights as the ones we document here.
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More interestingly, we find that ϕν is a decreasing function of α. That is, the more economic
agents care about aggregate economic activity, the weaker the response of the economy to innova-
tions in the underlying fundamentals. At the same time, we find that ϕε is an increasing function
of α. That is, the more economic agents care about aggregate economic activity, the stronger the
equilibrium impact of noise. These properties originate from the interaction of strategic complemen-
tarity with dispersed information. Indeed, if the underlying shock was common knowledge (which
here can be nested by taking the limit as the public signal becomes infinitely precise, κy → ∞),
then both ϕν and ϕε would cease to depend on α. But as long as information is dispersed, a higher
α reduces ϕν and raises ϕε. This highlights how strategic complementarity becomes crucial for the
business cycle once information is dispersed.
Corollary 2. When information is dispersed, and only then, stronger complementarity dampens the
impact of innovations in the fundamentals on equilibrium output and employment, while amplifying
the impact of noise.
The key intuition behind this result is the same as the one in the more abstract work of Morris and
Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007a). Public information and past fundamentals (which
here determine the prior about the current fundamentals) help forecast the aggregate level of output
relatively better than private information. The higher α is, the more the equilibrium level of output
in any given island depends on the local forecasts of aggregate output and the less it depends on the
local current fundamentals. It follows that a higher α induces the equilibrium output of each island
to be more anchored to the past aggregate fundamentals, more sensitive to public information, and
less sensitive to private information. The anchoring effect of past aggregate fundamentals explains
why aggregate output responds less to any innovation in the fundamentals, while the heightened
sensitivity to noisy public information explains why aggregate output responds more to noise. A
similar anchoring effect of the common prior underlies the inertia effects in Woodford (2003a),
Morris and Shin (2006), and Angeletos and Pavan (2007a), while the heightened sensitivity to
public information is the same as the one in Morris and Shin (2002). However, as mentioned before,
we favor a more general interpretation of the signal yt, not as a public signal, but rather as a source
of correlated noise in forecasts of economic fundamentals.
As another way to appreciate the aforementioned result, consider following variance-decomposition
exercise. Let log Qˆt be the projection of logQt on past fundamentals. The residual, which is given
by log Q˜t ≡ logQt− log Qˆt = ϕννt +ϕεεt, can be interpreted as the "high-frequency component" of
aggregate output. Its total variance is V ar(log Q˜t) = ϕ2νσ2ν+ϕ2εσ2ε , where σ2ν (≡ 1/κf ) is the variance
of the innovation in the fundamentals and σ2ε (≡ 1/κy) is the variance of the noise. The fraction of
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the high-frequency variation in output that originates in noise is thus given by the following ratio:14
Rnoise ≡ V ar(log Q˜t|νt)
V ar(log Q˜t)
=
ϕ2εσ
2
ε
ϕ2νσ
2
ν + ϕ2εσ2ε
.
Since a higher α raises ϕε and reduces ϕν , it necessarily raises this fraction: the more agents care
about the aggregate level of economic activity, the more the high-frequency volatility in output that
is driven by noise.
We can then further highlight the distinct nature of dispersed information by showing that, as
long as α is high enough, the contribution of noise to short-run fluctuations can be large even if the
level of noise is small. Note that the overall precision of an agent’s posterior about the underlying
fundamentals is given by κ = κ0 + κx + κy. We can then show the following.
Proposition 4. When information is dispersed and α is sufficiently high, agents can be arbitrarily
well informed about the fundamentals (κ ≈ ∞) and, yet, the high-frequency variation in aggregate
output can be driven almost exclusively by noise (Rnoise ≈ 1).
Clearly, this is not be possible when information is commonly shared. In that case, the contribu-
tion of noise on the business cycle is tightly connected to the precision of information and vanishes
as this precision becomes infinite. In contrast, when information is dispersed, the contribution of
noise in the business cycle can be high even when the precision of information is arbitrarily high.
What makes this possible is the combination of heterogeneous information with a sufficiently strong
degree of strategic complementarity induced by trade linkages. Note then how this result also con-
trasts with our earlier observation that this particular type of strategic complementarily would have
been irrelevant for the business cycle had information been commonly shared.
Finally, it is worth noting how the dispersion of information and trade linkages affect the cyclical
behavior of aggregate employment. The latter is given by
logNt = const+ 1θ (logQt − a¯t),
where a¯t is the aggregate productivity shock (i.e., the cross-sectional average of logAi,t). It is then
immediate that the response of employment to an aggregate shock in either tastes or monopoly power
is proportional to that of output. The same is true for the response to noise. More interestingly,
the response of employment to an aggregate productivity shock may now turn from a positive
sign under common information to a negative sign under dispersed information. To see this, let
β ≡ ∂f¯t∂a¯t = 1+1−θ++θγ > 0. When information is commonly shared, the sensitivity of output to
an innovation to aggregate productivity is simply β, and that of employment is 1θ (β − 1). When,
14This fraction equals 1 minus the R-square of the regression of log Q˜t on the innovation νt.
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instead, information is dispersed, the corresponding sensitivities are ϕνβ for output and 1θ (ϕνβ−1)
for employment, with ϕν as in (16). Suppose β > 1, which means that employment responds
positively to a productivity shock under common information, as in any plausible calibration of the
RBC framework. As noted earlier, ϕν is necessarily lower than 1 and is decreasing in α. It follows
that, when information is dispersed, stronger trade linkages dampen the response of employment
and may actually turn it negative.
5 Slow learning
The preceding has focused on a setting where the underlying shocks become common knowledge
within a period. Although this permitted a sharp theoretical analysis of the distinct implications
of dispersed information, and of its interaction with trade linkages, it makes it hard to map our
results to either empirical business cycles or calibrated RBC models. We now seek to illustrate how
incorporating slower learning can facilitate a better mapping between our analysis and the data.
Towards this goal, we need to relax the assumption that the aggregate state, Ωt, becomes pub-
licly revealed at the end of each period, and instead allow for more interesting learning dynamics.
Accommodating this possibility in a fully micro-founded way would require that there is no central-
ized commodity trading: with centralized trading, equilibrium prices are likely to reveal the state.
However, allowing for decentralized trading would complicate the analysis by introducing informa-
tional externalities and/or by letting the relevant state space explode as in Townsend (1983). We
are currently exploring some possibilities along these lines. However, for the current purposes, we
opt for tractability and expositional simplicity.
In particular, we assume that firms and workers do not observe the state at the end of each
period, nor do they learn about it from observing past aggregate economic outcomes or past prices,
Rather, they only keep receiving exogenous signals about the current fundamentals, of the same
type as in Assumption 1, and they use these signals to update each period their beliefs about the
underlying state. Think of this as follows. Each firm has two managers: one who decides the level of
employment and production; and another who sells the product, receives the revenue, and sends the
realized profits to the firm’s shareholders. The two managers share the same objective—maximize
firm valuation—but do not communicate with one another. Moreover, the first manager never
receives any signals on economic activity. He only observes the exogenous local private and public
signals. Similarly, the consumers, who observe all the prices in the economy, fail to communicate
this information to the workers in their respective families. The workers also base their decisions
solely on the exogenous signals.
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Needless to say, this specification of the learning process is not particularly elegant. However, it
would also be naive to take it too literally: the exogenous signals that we allow firms and workers
to receive each period are meant to capture more generally the multiple sources of information
that these agents may have. To the extent that the underlying shocks do not become common
knowledge too fast, more plausible formalizations of the learning process, albeit highly desirable,
need not impact the qualitative properties we wish highlight here.15
Under the aforementioned specification, equilibrium behavior continues to be characterized by
the same best-response-like condition as in the baseline model:
log qi,t = (1− α)fi,t + αEi,t [logQt] , (17)
where we have normalized the constant to zero. The only difference is in the information that
underlies the expectation operator in this condition. Finally, for concreteness, we henceforth focus
on productivity shocks as the only shock to fundamentals: fi,t = β logAi,t, with β ≡ 1+1−θ++θγ .
The procedure we follow to solve for the equilibrium dynamics is based on Kalman filtering and
is similar to the one in Woodford (2003a). We guess and verify that the aggregate state can be
summarized in a vector Xt comprised of the aggregate fundamental and aggregate output:
Xt ≡
 f¯t
logQt
 , (18)
Firms and workers in any given island never observe the state, but instead receive the following
vector of signals each period:
zit ≡
 xit
yt
 =
 f¯t + ςit
f¯t + εt
 (19)
As emphasized before, yt should not be taken too literally—it is a convenient modeling device for
introducing common noise in the agents’ forecasts of the state of the economy. Finally, we guess
and verify that the state vector Xt follows a simple law of motion:
Xt = MXt−1 +mννt +mεεt (20)
where M is a 2 × 2 matrix, while mν and mε are 2 × 1 vectors. We then seek to characterize the
equilibrium values of M,mν , and mε.
15The learning process we assume here is similar to the one in Woodford (2003a). We refer the reader to Amador
and Weill (2008), Angeletos and La’O (2008), Angeletos and Pavan (2009), Hellwig (2002), and Lorenzoni (2008) for
some alternative formalizations of the learning process. None of these alternative formalizations would crucially affect
the positive results we document in this section. However, some of them would have distinct normative implications,
to the extent that they make the learning endogenous to the actions of other agents. See Angeletos and La’O (2008)
and Angeletos and Pavan (2009) on this issue.
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In each period t, firms and workers start with some prior about Xt and use the new signals
that they receive in the beginning of period t to update their beliefs about Xt. Local output is
then determined Condition (17) then givens local output as a function of the local belief about
Xt. Aggregating across islands, we obtain the aggregate level of output. In equilibrium, the law
of motion that aggregate output follows must match the one believed by the firms. Therefore
the equilibrium is a fixed point between the law of motion believed by agents and used to form
their forecasts of the aggregate state, and the law of motion induced by the optimal output and
employment decisions that firms and workers are making following their signal extraction problem.
We characterize the fixed point of this problem in the Appendix and use its solution to numerically
simulate the impulse responses of output and employment to positive innovations in vt and εt.
For our numerical simulations, we interpret a period as a quarter. Accordingly, we let σν = 0.02
for the standard deviation of the productivity innovation and ψ = 0.99 for its persistence. Next,
we set θ = .60 and  = .5, which correspond to an income share of labor equal to 60% and a
Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to 2. These parameter values are broadly consistent with
the literature. Less standard is our choice of γ. Recall that in our setting there is no capital,
implying that labor income is the only source of wealth, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is irrelevant, and γ only controls the income elasticity of labor supply. We accordingly set γ = .2 to
ensure an empirically plausible income effect on labor supply.16 Next, we set the standard deviations
of the noises as σx = σy = 5σv. These values are arbitrary, but they are not implausible: when the
period is interpreted as a quarter, the information about the current innovations to fundamentals
and/or the current level of economic activity is likely to be very limited. Finally, we do not pick
any specific value for α (equivalently, ρ). Rather, we study how the variance decomposition of the
high-frequency components of output and employment varies as we vary α from 0 to 1 (keeping in
mind that a higher α means stronger trade linkagess or, equivalently, a lower ρ).
5.1 Impulse responses to productivity and noise shocks
Figure 1 plots the impulse responses of aggregate output and employment to a positive innovation
of productivity, for various degrees of α. (The size of the innovation here, and in all other impulse
responses we report, is equal to one standard deviation.) Clearly, if aggregate productivity were
common knowledge, then output would follow the same AR(1) process as aggregate productivity
itself. This is simply because there is no capital in our model. The same thing happens when
information is dispersed but there is no strategic complementarity in output decisions (α = 0).
16Woodford (2003a) uses a similar number for calibrating the New-Keynesian model in the absence of capital.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a positive innovation in productivity.
This is simply because when α = 0 islands are effectively isolated from one another; but as each
island knows perfectly its own productivity, the entire economy responds to the aggregate shock as
if the aggregate shock had been common knowledge.
In contrast, when information is dispersed but islands are interconnected (α 6= 0), employment
and output in one island depends crucially on expectations of employment and output in other
islands. As a result, even though each island remains perfectly informed about their local funda-
mentals, each island responds less to the shock than what it would have done had the shock been
common knowledge, precisely because each island expects output in other islands to respond less.
Note then that the key for the response of each island is not per se whether the island can disen-
tangle an aggregate shock from an idiosyncratic shock. Even if a particular island was perfectly
informed about the aggregate shock, as long as α > 0 the island will respond less to this shock
than under common knowledge if it expects the other island to respond less, presumably because
the other island has imperfect information about the shock. Thus, the key for the inertia in the
response of aggregate outcomes is the uncertainty islands face about one another’s response, not
necessarily the uncertainty they themselves face about the aggregate shock.
As evident in Figure 1, the equilibrium inertia is higher the higher the degree of strategic
complementarity. This is because of two reasons. First, there is a direct effect: the higher α is, the
less the incentive of each island to respond to the underlying shock for any given expectation of the
response of other islands. But then there is also an indirect, multiplier-like, effect: as all islands are
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to noise.
expected to respond less to the underlying shock, each island finds it optimal to respond even less.
At the same time, the inertia vanishes in the long-run: the long-run response of the economy
to the shock is the same as with common knowledge. This seems intuitive: as time passes, agents
become better informed about the underlying aggregate shock. However, that’s only part of the
story. First, note that agents are always perfectly informed about their own fundamentals, so there
is no learning in this dimension. Second, recall that agents do not care per se about the aggregate
fundamentals, so the fact that they are learning more about them is per se inconsequential. Rather,
the key is that agents in each island are revising their forecasts of the output of other islands. What
then drives the result that inertia vanishes in the long-run is merely that forecasts of aggregate
output eventually converge their common-knowledge counterpart.17
Finally, a salient property of the dynamic response of employment is that, for sufficiently high
α, the short-run impact of a productivity shock on employment turns from positive to negative; this
happens for parameters values for which the model would have generate a strong positive response
had information been symmetric. We find this striking. The baseline RBC paradigm has long been
17It may be hard to fully appreciate this point, because how fast output forecasts converge to their common-
knowledge counterpart is itself pinned down by the speed of learning about the underlying aggregate productivity
shock. However, with richer information structures, one can disentangle the speed of adjustment in output forecasts
from the speed of learning about the fundamentals. It is then only the former that matters for the result. See
Angeletos and La’O (2009a) for a related example within the context of a Calvo-like monetary model.
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criticized for generating a near perfect correlation between employment and output, whereas in the
data this correlation is near zero. In our setting, this correlation could be close to zero or even turn
negative if α is sufficiently high. Of course, correlations confound the effects of multiple shocks.
Some authors in the structural VAR literature have thus sought to show that identified technology
shocks lead to a reduction in employment and have then argue that this as a clear rejection of the
RBC paradigm (e.g., Galí, 1999; Galí and Rabanal, 2004). Here, we have shown that dispersed
information may potentially help the RBC paradigm accommodate this fact without any need to
invoke sticky prices.
Turning to the effects of noise, in Figure 2 we consider the impulse responses of output and em-
ployment in response to a positive innovation in εt. As emphasized before, this should be interpreted
as a positive error in expectations of aggregate output, rather than as an error in expectations of
aggregate fundamentals. When α = 0, such forecast errors are irrelevant, simply because individ-
ual incentives do not depend on forecasts of aggregate activity. But when α = 0, they generate
a positive response in output and employment, thus becoming partly self-fulfilling. Furthermore,
the stronger the complementarity, the more pronounced the impact of these errors on aggregate
employment and output.
The figure considers a positive noise shock, which means a positive shift in expectations about
economic activity. The impact of a negative shift in expectations is symmetric. Note that when
these shocks occur, output, employment and consumption move in the same direction, without any
movement in TFP. The resulting booms and recessions could thus be (mis)interpreted as a certain
type of demand shocks. We will return to this point in a moment. Finally, note that the impact of
these noise shocks on output and employment can be quite persistent, even though the noise itself
is not. This is simply because the associated forecast errors are themselves persistent.
5.2 Variance decomposition and forecast errors
Comparing the responses of employment with those of output to the two shocks, we see that the
former is smaller than the latter in the case of productivity shocks but quite larger in the case of
noise. This is simply because productivity shocks have a double effect on output, both directly
and indirectly through employment, while the noise impacts output only through employment. But
then the response of employment to noise is bound to be stronger than that of output as long as
there are diminishing returns to labor (θ < 1), and the more show the lower θ. It follows that noise
contributes to a higher relative volatility for employment, while productivity shocks contribute in
the opposite direction. In the standard RBC framework, employment may exhibit a higher volatility
than output to the extent that there are powerful intertemporal substitution effects (which here we
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Figure 3: Variance decomposition.
have ruled out since we have also ruled out capital). However, the RBC framework is known to lack
in this dimension. Our results here indicate how noise could help improve the performance of the
RBC framework in this dimension.
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is evident that low-frequency movements in employment and
output are dominated by the productivity shocks, while noise contributes relatively more to high-
frequency movements. To further illustrate this property, in Figure 3 we plot the variance de-
composition of output and employment at different time horizons. For sufficiently strong strategic
complementarity, productivity shocks explain only a small fraction of the high-frequency variation
in output—short-run fluctuations are driven mostly by noise. As for employment, the contribution
of noise is quite dramatic.
Finally, Figure 4 plots the dynamics of the average forecast of aggregate output and the true
level of aggregate output in response to a productivity or noise shock. The average forecast error
is the distance between the two aforementioned variables. A salient feature of this figure is that
forecast errors are smallest when the degree of strategic complementarity is highest.
This is crucial. We earlier showed that a higher α leads to both more inertia in the response
of output and employment to productivity shock, and to a bigger impact of noise. In this sense,
the deviation from the common-knowledge benchmark is highest when α is highest. However, one
should not expect that these large deviations will show up in large forecast errors. To the contrary,
a higher α implies that actual economic activity is more driven by forecasts of economic activity, so
that at the end a higher α guarantees that the forecast errors are smaller. It follows that, as we vary
α, the magnitude of the deviations of actual outcomes from their common-knowledge counterparts
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Figure 4: Forecast errors in response to productivity and noise shocks.
is inversely related to the magnitude of the associated forecast errors. Indeed, both the inertia and
the impact of noise become nearly self-fulfilling as α gets closer to 1.
In conclusion, the instantaneous impact of the response of output and employment to produc-
tivity and noise shocks behave very much like in the baseline model: complementarity dampens the
effect of productivity shocks, while amplifying the response to noise. However, these effects now
persist for more than a period. Finally, provided that α is high enough, the inertia can be quite
strong, and the contribution of noise to high-frequency variation can be quite high, while at the
same time the associated forecast errors are very small.
5.3 Demand shocks, new-Keynesian models, and structural VARs
Many economists have found the idea that short-run fluctuations are driven primarily by technology
shocks implausible either on a priori grounds or on the basis of certain structural VARs. Blanchard
and Quah (1989) were the first to attempt to provide some evidence that short-run fluctuations
are driven by "demand" rather than "supply" shocks, albeit with the caveat that one cannot really
know what the shocks they identify really capture. Subsequent contributions by Galí (1999), Basu,
Fernald and Kimball (2006), and others have tried to improve in that dimension. One way or
another, though, this basic view appears to underly the entire New-Keynesian literature.
Our findings here are consistent with this view. In our environment, technology shocks may
explain only a small fraction of the high-frequency volatility in macroeconomic outcomes. However,
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the residual fluctuations have nothing to do with monetary shocks. Rather, they are the product of
the noise in the agents’ information. Importantly, to the extent that information is dispersed and
trade linkages are important, this noise might be quite small and nevertheless explain a big fraction
of the high-frequency volatility in macroeconomic outcomes.
Furthermore, the noise-driven fluctuations we have documented here, albeit being purely neo-
classical in their nature, they could well be interpreted as some kind of “demand” or “monetary”
shocks in the following sense. This is because they share many of the features often associated with
such shocks: they contribute to positive co-movement in employment, output and consumption;
they are orthogonal to the underlying productivity shocks; they are closely related to shifts in ex-
pectations of aggregate demand; and they explain a large portion of the high-frequency variation in
employment and output while vanishing at low frequencies.18
To better appreciate this, suppose that we generate data from our model and let an applied
macroeconomist—preferably of the new-keynesian type—to run a structural VAR as in Blanchard
and Quah (1989) or Galí (1999). One would then correctly identify the underlying innovations to
productivity by the shock that is allowed to have a long-run effect on output or labor productivity,
and the underlying noise shocks by the residual. In the language of Blanchard and Quah, the
productivity shocks would be interpreted as "supply shocks" and the noise shocks as "demand
shocks". however, the latter would have no relation to sticky prices and the like; to the contrary,
both type of shocks emerge from a purely supply-side mechanism. In the language of Galí (1999), on
the other hand, the productivity shocks would be interpreted as "technology shocks". Furthermore,
as already noted, the short-run response of employment to these identified shocks would be negative
for high enough α; but this would no favor a sticky-price interpretation.
As mentioned in the introduction, Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2006), Christiano et al. (2008),
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), and Lorenzoni (2008) have explored the
idea that noisy news about future productivity contribute to short-run fluctuations. Furthermore,
Lorenzoni (2008) interprets the resulting fluctuations as "demand shocks" and discusses how they
help match related facts. However, all these papers focus on fluctuations that originate from uncer-
tainty about a certain type of fundamentals (namely future productivity), not on the distinct type
of uncertainty we highlight in this paper.19 Second, as often the case with new-keynesian models,
Lorenzoni’s "demand shocks" confound real shocks with monetary shocks. By this we mean the
18A priori, our predictions regarding real quantities seems consistent with any predictions about nominal prices.
Further exploring under what conditions our noise-driven fluctuations could be associated also with procyclical
nominal prices requires a monetary extension of the model.
19In his baseline model, Lorenzoni considers a representative-agent model with symmetric information. In an
extension, he allows for dispersed information, but only to facilitate a more plausible calibration of the model.
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following. Since there is no capital in his model (as in ours), expectations of future productivity
would have been irrelevant for current macroeconomic outcomes had nominal prices been flexible;
the only reason then that news about future productivity cause demand-like fluctuations is that
they cause an expansion in monetary policy away from the one that would replicate flexible-price al-
locations. In contrast, our "demand shocks" obtain in an RBC setting and are completely unrelated
to monetary policy.
Finally, note that a positive productivity shock in our model induces a small impact on output
at high frequencies, followed by a large persistence response at lower frequencies.20 Again these
properties are consistent with the estimated dynamics of “technology” shocks.
More generally, it is interesting to note that in many empirical new-keynesian models sticky
prices dampen the response of output to productivity shocks relative to the RBC framework and
help get a negative response for employment. According to some researchers, these properties seem
to be more consistent with the data than their RBC counterparts. However, what is a success for
these models is only a failure for monetary policy: the only reason that the response of the economy
to productivity shocks in the baseline new-keynesian model differs from that in the baseline RBC
model is that monetary policy fails to replicate flexible-price allocations, which is typically the
optimal thing to do. Here, instead, we obtain the same empirical properties without introducing
sticky properties and without presuming any suboptimality for policy.
Perhaps as interestingly, our approach may have intriguing implications for the identification of
monetary shocks. One of the standard identification strategies is based on the idea that monetary
policy often reacts to measurement error in the level of aggregate economic activity (Bernanke and
Mihov, 1995; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999). In particular, the idea is that measurement
error justifies the existence of random shocks to monetary policy, which are orthogonal to the
true underlying state of the economy. If one then traces the impact of these particular shocks on
subsequent aggregate outcomes, one can escape the endogeneity problem and identify the impact
of monetary shocks. However, these measurement errors, or more generally any forecast errors that
the central bank makes about current and future economic activity, are likely to be correlated with
the corresponding forecast errors of the private sector. But then the so-identified monetary shocks
may actually be proxying for the real effects of the forecast errors of the private sector, which
unfortunately are not observed by the econometrician.
20In our numerical exercises, the impact of the productivity shock vanishes asymptotically, only because we have
assumed that a¯t is (slowly) mean-reverting. If instead we assume that a¯t is a random walk, then the long-run impact
of a productivity shocks becomes positive, while the rest of the results remain unaffected.
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Figure 5: Labor wedges and Solow residuals.
5.4 Labor wedges and Solow residuals
Many authors have argued that a good theory of the business cycle must explain the observed
variation in the labor wedge and the Solow residual (e.g., Hall, 1997; Rotemberg and Woodford,
1999; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007; Shimer, 2009). We now consider the implications of our
model for these two key characteristics of the business cycle.
Following the literature, we define the labor wedge τn,t implicitly by
N ε−1t
C−γt
= (1− τn,t) θQt
Nt
.
The left panel of Figure 5 plots the impulse response of the labor wedge to a positive productivity
and a positive noise shock. The labor wedge follows very different dynamics in response to the
two types of shocks. In particular, a positive productivity shock induces a positive response in the
labor wedge, implying positive comovement of the labor wedge with output. On the other hand, a
positive noise shock produces a negative response in the observed labor wedge, implying a negative
comovement with output.
Multiple authors have documented that variation in the labor wedge plays a large role in ac-
counting for business-cycle fluctuations during the post-war period. Importantly, the labor wedge
is highly countercyclical, exhibiting sharp increases during recessions. Shimer (2009) surveys the
facts and the multiple explanations that have been proposed for the observed countercyclicality of
the labor. These include taxes, shocks to the disutility of labor, mark-up shocks, fluctuations in
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wage-setting power, and Shimer’s preferred explanation, search frictions in the labor market. Here,
we have found that noise offers another possible explanation for the same fact.
We finally consider the potential implications of our results for observed Solow residuals. To-
wards this goal, we now introduce a variable input in the production function; the optimal use of
this input responds to shocks, but is unobserved by the econometrician and is thus absorbed in the
Solow residual. As in King and Rebelo (2000), our preferred interpretation of this input is capital
utilization. The only caveat is that in our model capital exogenously fixed. However, we could
introduce capital following the same approach as Angeletos and La’O (2009b), without affecting the
qualitative points we seek to make here.
We denote the unobserved input by χit; we let the gross product of a firm be q˜it = A˜itχ1−θ˜it n
θ˜
it;
and we specify the cost of this input in terms of final product as δχ1+ξit , where ξ, δ > 0. The
net product of a firm is then qit = q˜it − δχ1+ξut . Solving out for the optimal level of this input,
The optimal level of this input is given by equating its marginal product with its marginal cost:
(1− θ˜) qitχit = δ (1 + ξ)χ
ξ
it. We thus obtain obtain the following reduced-form production function:
qit = Aitnθit (21)
where θ ≡
(
1+ξ
θ˜+ξ
)
θ˜ andAit ≡
(
1+ξ
θ˜+ξ
)
A˜
1+ξ
θ+ξ
it . Our analysis then remains intact, provided we reinterpret
the production function in the above way. Accordingly, we set θ˜ = .6 and ξ = .1 (a preferred value
in King and Rebelo, 2000), which implies θ = .88. We also re-calibrate the underlying aggregate
productivity shocks so that the observed Solow residual (SRt ≡ logQt − θ logNt) implied by the
common-knowledge version of the model continues to have a standard deviation of 0.02 and a
persistence of 0.99.
The right panel of Figure 5 plots the dynamic response of the Solow residual to a productivity or a
noise shock. Both shocks raise the measured Solow residual, but only the innovation in productivity
has a persistent effect. Moreover, these responses of the Solow residual mirror those of output. It
follows that the Solow residual and output move tightly together, much alike in a standard RBC
model, although employment has the more distinct behavior we mentioned earlier.
Finally, it is worth noting that additional variation in measured Solow residuals could obtain
from variation in the dispersion of information, simply because the dispersion of information affects
the cross-sectional allocations to resources. Note in particular that the observed heterogeneity in
forecast surveys is highly countercyclical, suggesting that the dispersion of information may also be
countercyclical. Exploring how such variation in the dispersion of information affects the business
cycle is left for future work.
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5.5 Discussion
While the characterization of equilibrium in Section 3 allowed for arbitrary information structures,
the more concrete positive results that we documented thereafter presumed a specific, Gaussian
information structure (Assumption 1). However, we do not expect any of the predictions we have
emphasized to be unduly sensitive to the details of the information structure.
We build this expectation on the following observations. Proposition 1 permits us to map our
economy to a class of games with linear best responses, like those studied in Morris and Shin
(2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009). In this class of games, one can show under arbitrary
information structures that a stronger strategic complementarity makes equilibrium outcomes less
sensitive to first-order beliefs (the forecasts of the fundamentals) and more sensitive to higher-order
beliefs (the forecasts of the forecasts of others). One can then proceed to show quite generally
that higher-order beliefs are more sensitive to the initial common prior, to public signals, and
to signals with strongly correlated errors, than lower-order beliefs, simply because these pieces of
information are relatively better predictors of the forecasts of others. It follows that higher-order
beliefs are less sensitive to innovations in the fundamentals and more sensitive to common sources of
noise than lower-order beliefs. Combined, these observations explain why stronger complementarity
dampens the response of the economy to innovations in fundamentals while amplifying the impact
of noise—which are the key properties that drive the results we documented in Sections 4 and 5.
We conclude that these results are not unduly sensitive to the details of the underlying information
structure; rather, they obtain from robust properties of higher-order beliefs and the very nature of
the general-equilibrium interactions in our economy.
Our analysis has implications, not only for aggregate fluctuations, but also for the cross-sectional
dispersion of prices and quantities. As evident from condition (24), a higher α necessarily reduces
the sensitivity of local output to local fundamentals, while increasing the sensitivity to expectations
of aggregate output. When information is commonly shared, all agents share the same expectation
of aggregate output, and hence heterogeneity in output (and thereby in prices) can originate only
from heterogeneity in fundamentals (productivities, tastes, etc). It then follows that a higher α
necessarily reduces cross-sectional dispersion in output and prices, simply because it dampens the
only source of heterogeneity. However, once information is dispersed, there is an additional source
of heterogeneity: different firms have different expectations of aggregate economic activity. It then
follows that a higher α dampens the former source of heterogeneity while amplifying the latter.
We conclude that, once information is dispersed, the impact of complementarity on cross-sectional
dispersion is ambiguous—which also implies that evidence on the cross-sectional dispersion of prices
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and quantities may provide little guidance for a quantitative assessment of our results.21
Similarly, evidence on the size of monopolistic mark-ups, or the elasticity of demands faced by
individual firms, do not necessarily discipline the magnitude of our results. This is for two reasons.
First, in our model, the mark-up and the elasticity of individual demands identify only η, whereas
it is ρ that matters for complementarity. And second, as evident from the definition of α, a high
complementarity in our model is consistent with any value of ρ, provided that there is a sufficiently
small wealth effect on labor supply in the short run, a sufficiently high Frisch elasticity (as in Hansen,
1985), and nearly linear returns to labor in the short run (as in King and Rebelo, 2000).
Finally, it is worth noting that, unlike what suggested by one of our discussants, the findings of
Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009) bear little relevance to our own analysis. That paper considers a
New-Keynesian model in which firms cannot tell apart aggregate monetary shocks from idiosyncratic
productivity or demand shocks. For a particular calibration, this confusion induces firms to adjust
their prices a lot in response to monetary shocks even when these shocks are unobserved, thus leaving
little room for real effects. These findings are interesting on their own right—and indeed complement
our motivation for focusing on real shocks. However, it was unfortunate for our discussant to
extrapolate from that paper to the likely quantitative importance of our results. First, the core
mechanism of that paper does not apply to our context: if firms were to confuse aggregate shocks
for local ones in our model, this confusion would only reinforce our results.22 And second, the
quantitative findings of that paper are based on a number of heroic assumptions, which might serve
certain purposes but are completely out of place in our own context.23
21One of our discussants made the opposite argument. But his argument was based on the premise that a higher
α necessarily reduces cross-sectional dispersion. This happens to be true under the specific signal structure we
introduced in Assumption 1 but, as just explained, is not true in general. We refer the reader to Angeletos and
La’0 (2007) for a stark example where higher complementarity increases both the non-fundamental component of the
business cycle and the cross-sectional dispersion of quantities and prices.
22To see this, recall from Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 that the response of equilibrium output to an idiosyncratic
shock in fundamentals is given by ϕf = 1 − α, while its response to an aggregate shock is given by ϕν = 1 −
α
κf
(1−α)κx+κy+κf . As long as α > 0, ϕf is smaller than ϕν , which means that mistaking an aggregate shock for an
idiosyncratic shock only helps dampen the response of the economy to the aggregate shock.
23In particular, Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009) assume that workers are perfectly informed about the monetary
shocks, so that nominal wages adjust one-to-one with them. When firms face constant real marginal costs and iso-
elastic demands, this assumption can alone guarantee that prices will move one-to-one with monetary shocks even if
firms cannot tell whether their nominal wages have moved because of nominal or idiosyncratic reasons. Clearly, the
empirical relevance of this assumption is questionable even within the context of that paper. As for our own context,
we see no good reason for assuming a priori that workers are perfectly informed about the aggregate real shocks
hitting the economy. Furthermore, Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009) assume that firms are free to adjust their
action at no cost and at a daily or weekly frequency. When that action is interpreted as a nominal price (as in that
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With these observations we are not trying to escape the need for a serious quantitative exercise,
nor are we ready to speculate on the outcome of such an exercise. We are only trying to provide some
guidance for any future quantitative exploration of our results. The key effects we have documented
in this paper hinge only on (i) the sensitivity of individual output to forecasts of aggregate output
and (ii) the sensitivity of these forecasts to the underlying shocks. We are thus skeptical that micro
evidence on prices or quantities can alone provide enough guidance on the quantitative importance
of our results. We instead propose that a quantitative assessment of our results should rely more
heavily on survey evidence about the agents’ forecasts of economic activity. Indeed, these forecasts
concisely summarize all the informational effects in our model, and their joint stochastic behavior
with actual outcomes speaks to the heart of our results. Although we do recognize that the quality
of such survey evidence raises concerns, we feel that the provide a good starting point.
6 Efficiency
The positive properties we have documented are intriguing. However, their normative content is
unclear. Is the potentially high contribution of noise to business-cycle fluctuations, or the potentially
high inertia in the response of the economy to innovations in productivity, a symptom of inefficiency?
More generally, it is obvious that a planner could improve welfare if he could centralize all
the information that is dispersed in society and then dictate allocations on the basis of all this
information. But this would endow the planner with a power that seems far remote from the
powers that policy makers have in reality. Furthermore, the resulting superiority of centralized
allocations over their decentralized equilibrium counterparts would not be particularly insightful,
since it would be driven mostly by the assumption that the planner has the superior power to
overcome the information frictions imposed on the market. Thus, following Angeletos and Pavan
(2007a, 2009) and Angeletos and La’O (2008), we contend that a more interesting question—on
both practical and conceptual grounds—is to understand whether a planner could improve upon
the equilibrium while being subject to the same informational frictions as the equilibrium.
This motivates us to consider a constrained efficiency concept that permits the planner to choose
any resource-feasible allocation that respects the geographical segmentation of information in the
economy—by which we simply mean that the planner cannot make the production and employment
choices of firms and workers in one island contingent on the private information of another island.
paper), this assumption serves a useful pedagogical purpose: it helps isolate information frictions from sticky prices.
But once that action is interpreted as a real employment or investment choice (as in our model), this assumption
stops making sense even from pedagogical perspective: the "stickiness" of real employment and investment decisions
is merely a matter of technology in the model.
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A formal definition of this efficiency concept and a detailed analysis of efficient allocations can be
found, for a variant model, in Angeletos and La’O (2008). Here we focus on the essence.
Because of the concavity of preferences and technologies, efficiency dictates symmetry in con-
sumption across households, as well as symmetry across firms and workers within any given island.
Using these facts, we can represent the planning problem we are interested in as follows.
Planner’s problem. Choose a pair of local production and employment strategies, q : Sω × SΩ →
R+ and n : Sω × SΩ → R+, and an aggregate output function, Q : S2Ω → R+, so as to maximize∫
SΩ
[
U(Q(Ωt,Ωt−1))−
∫
Sω
1
1+S(ω)n(ω,Ωt−1)
1+dΩt(ω)
]
dP(Ωt|Ωt−1) (22)
subject to
q(ω,Ωt−1) = A(ω)n(ω,Ωt−1)θ ∀(ω,Ωt−1) (23)
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) =
[∫
q(ω,Ωt−1)
ρ−1
ρ dΩt(ω)
] ρ
ρ−1
∀(Ωt,Ωt−1) (24)
where P(Ωt|Ωt−1) denotes the probability distribution of Ωt conditional on Ωt−1.
This problem has a simple interpretation. U(Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) is the utility of consumption for
the representative household; 1S(ω)n(ω,Ωt−1)
 is the marginal disutility of labor for the typical
worker in a given island; and the corresponding integral is the overall disutility of labor for the
representative household. Furthermore, note that, once the planner picks the production strategy
q, the employment strategy n is pinned down by (23) and the aggregate output function Q is pinned
down by (23). The reduced-form objective in (22) is thus a functional that gives the level of welfare
implied by any arbitrary production strategy that the planner dictates to the economy.
Because this problem is strictly concave, it has a unique solution and this solution is pinned
down by the following first-order condition:24
Sitn

it = Eit
[
U ′ (Qt)
(
qit
Qt
)− 1
ρ
](
θAitn
θ−1
it
)
. (25)
This condition simply states that the planner dictates the agents to equate the social cost of employ-
ment in their island with the local expectation of the social value of the marginal product of that
employment. Essentially the same condition characterizes (first-best) efficiency in the standard,
symmetric-information paradigm. The only difference is that there expectations are conditional
on the commonly-available information set, while here they are conditional on the locally-available
information sets.
24Because of the continuum, the efficient allocation is determined only for almost every ω. For expositional
simplicity, we bypass the almost qualification throughout the paper.
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As with equilibrium, we can use qit = Aitnθit to eliminate nit in the above condition, thereby
reaching the following result.
Proposition 5. Let
f∗(ω) ≡ log
θ 1θ+γ−1
(
A(ω)
S(ω)
) θ

θ
+γ−1
(
A(ω)
S(ω)
) θ

θ
+γ−1

be a composite of the local productivity and taste shocks. The efficient strategy q : Sω ×SΩ → R+ is
the fixed point to the following:
log q (ωt,Ωt−1) = (1− α)f∗(ωt) + α log
{
E
[
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1)
1
ρ
−γ
∣∣∣ωt,Ωt−1] 11ρ−γ} ∀(ωt,Ωt−1), (26)
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) =
[∫
q(ω,Ωt−1)
ρ−1
ρ dΩt(ω)
] ρ
ρ−1
∀(Ωt,Ωt−1). (27)
A number of remarks are worth making. First, note that the composite shock f∗t plays a similar
role for the efficient allocation as the composite shock ft played for the equilibrium: it identifies the
fundamentals that are relevant from the planner’s point of view. This is evident, not only from the
above result, but also directly from the planner’s problem: using qt = Atnθt to eliminate nt in the
expression for welfare given in the planner’s problem, we can express welfare as a simple function
of the production strategy and the composite shock f∗t alone.
Second, note that Proposition 5 permits a game-theoretic interpretation of the efficient alloca-
tion, much alike what Proposition 1 did for equilibrium: the efficient allocation of the economy
coincides with the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a game in which the different players are the different
islands of the economy and their best responses are given by (26).
Third, note that, apart from the different composite shock, the structure of the fixed point
that characterizes the efficient and the equilibrium allocation is the same: once we replace f∗(ωt)
with f(ωt), condition (26) coincides with its equilibrium counterpart, condition (7). And because
f∗(ωt) = f(ωt) for every ωt if and only if there is no monopoly power, the following is immediate.
Corollary 3. In the absence of monopoly distortions, the equilibrium is efficient, no matter the
information structure.
This result establishes that neither the presence of noise nor the dispersion of information are
per se sources of inefficiency. This result might sound bizarre in light of our earlier results that the
economy can feature extreme amplification effects, with a tiny amount of noise contributing to large
aggregate fluctuations. However, it should be ex post obvious. What causes these large positive
effects is the combination of dispersed information and strong complementarity. But neither one
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introduces a wedge between the equilibrium and the planner. Indeed, the geographical segmenta-
tion of information is similar to a technological constraint that impacts equilibrium and efficient
allocations in a completely symmetric way. As for the complementarity, it’s origin is preferences
and technologies, not any type of market inefficiency, guaranteeing that private motives in coordi-
nating economic activity are perfectly aligned with social motives. It follows that, when stronger
complementarity amplifies the impact of noise, it does so without causing any inefficiency.25
We can generalize this result for situations where firms have monopoly power, to the extent that
there are no aggregate shocks to monopoly power, as follows.
Corollary 4. Suppose that information is Gaussian (Assumption 1 holds) and there are no aggregate
mark-up shocks (f¯∗t − f¯t is fixed). Then, the the business cycle is efficient in the sense the gap
logQt − logQ∗t between the equilibrium and the efficient level of output is invariant.
If we allow for mark-up shocks, then clearly the equilibrium business cycle ceases to be efficient.
But this is true irrespectively of whether information is dispersed or commonly shared. We conclude
that the dispersion of information per se is not a source of inefficiency, whether one considers a
competitive RBC or a monopolistic New-Keynesian model. We further discuss the implications of
this result for optimal policy and the social value of information in Angeletos and La’O (2008).
We conclude this section with an important qualification. While our efficiency results allowed
for an arbitrary information structure, they restricted the information structure to be exogenous
to the underlying allocations. This ignores the possibility that information gets endogenously ag-
gregated through prices, macro indicators, and other channels of social learning—which is clearly
an important omission. We address this issue, too, in Angeletos and La’O (2008), by allowing
information to get partly aggregated through certain price and quantity indicators. We first show
that a planner who internalizes the endogeneity of the information contained in these indicators will
choose a different allocation than the equilibrium. This typically means that the planner likes to
increase the sensitivity of allocations to private information, so as to increase the precision of the
information that gets revealed by the available macroeconomic indicators. We then explore policies
that could help in this direction.
7 Concluding remarks
The pertinent macroeconomics literature has used informational frictions to motivate why economic
agents may happen, or choose, to be partly unaware about the shocks hitting the economy. Some-
times the informational friction is exogenous, sometimes it is endogenized. Invariably, though, the
25As mentioned earlier, this is the opposite of what happens in Morris and Shin (2002).
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main modeling role of informational frictions seems to remain a simple and basic one: to limit the
knowledge that agents have about the underlying shocks to economic fundamentals.
Our approach, instead, seeks to highlight that the heterogeneity of information may have a
very distinct mark on macroeconomic outcomes than the uncertainty about fundamentals. We
highlighted this in this paper by showing how the heterogeneity of information can induce significant
inertia in the response of the economy to productivity shocks, and can also generate significant noise-
driven fluctuations, even when the agents are well informed about the underlying fundamentals.
In Angeletos and La’O (2009b), we further show that the heterogeneity of information can open
the door to a novel type of sentiment shocks—namely shocks that are independent of either the
underlying fundamentals or the agents’ expectations of the fundamentals and nevertheless cause
variation in the agents’ forecasts of economic activity and thereby in actual economic activity,
despite the uniqueness of equilibrium. This in turn permits a broader interpretation of what noise
stood for in the present paper: noise could be interpreted more generally as any variation in the
forecasts of economic activity that is orthogonal by fundamentals.
In this paper, we focused on the dispersion of information about the real shocks hitting the econ-
omy, ruling out sticky prices and dismissing any lack of common knowledge about innovations to
monetary policy. This, however, does not mean that we see no interesting interaction between dis-
persed information and nominal frictions. It only means that we find it a good modeling benchmark
to assume common knowledge of the current monetary policy. Where we instead see an intriguing
interaction between our approach and monetary policy is the following dimension: when there is
dispersed information about the underlying real shocks hitting the economy and nominal prices are
rigid, the response of monetary policy to any information that becomes available about these shocks
may be crucial for how the economy responds to these shocks in the first place. This point was first
emphasized at a more abstract level by Angeletos and Pavan (2007b, 2009) and is further explored
by Angeletos and La’O (2008) and Lorenzoni (2009) within new-Keynesian variants of the economy
we have studied in this paper.
We conclude with a comment on the alternative formalizations of informational frictions. For
certain questions, one formalization might be preferable to another.26 For other questions, however,
the specifics of any particular formalization may prove unnecessary, or even distracting. The results
we have emphasized in this paper appear to hinge only on the heterogeneity of information, not
on the specific details of the information structure. To highlight this, we showed that the informa-
tion structure matters for economic outcomes only through its impact on the agents’ forecasts of
26For example, if one wishes to understand which particular pieces of information agents are likely to pay more
attention to, Sims (2003) offers an elegant methodology.
42
aggregate economic activity. We would thus invite other researchers not to commit to any partic-
ular formalization of the information structure (including ours), but rather to take a more flexible
approach to the modeling of informational frictions. After all, the data cannot possibly inform us
about the details of the information structure. What, instead, the data can do is to inform us about
the stochastic properties of the agents’ forecasts of economic activity—which, as mentioned, is the
only channel through which the dispersion of information matters of economic behavior. Thus, in
our view, it is only this evidence that should help discipline the theory.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The characterization of the equilibrium follows directly from the discus-
sion in the main text. Its existence and uniqueness can be obtained by showing that the equilibrium
coincides with the solution to a concave planning problem. For the case that there is no monopoly
power (η =∞), this follows directly from our analysis in Section 6 and in Proposition 5. A similar
result can be obtained for the case with monopoly power.
Proof of Proposition 2. This follows from the discussion in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that, conditional on ωt and Ωt−1, Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) is log-normal,
with variance independent of ωt; that this is true under the log-normal structure for the underlying
shocks and signals we will prove shortly. Using log-normality of Q in condition (7), we infer that
the equilibrium production strategy must satisfy condition (9) with
const =
α
2
(
1
ρ
− γ
)
Var [logQ(Ωt,Ωt−1)|ωt,Ωt−1]
and Var [logQ(Ωt,Ωt−1)|ωt,Ωt−1] = Var [logQ(Ωt,Ωt−1)|Ωt−1].
We now guess and verify a log-linear equilibrium under the log-normal specification for the
shock and information structure. Suppose the equilibrium production strategy takes a log-linear
form: log qt = ϕ0 +ϕ−1f¯t−1 +ϕfft +ϕxxt +ϕyyt, for some coefficients (ϕ−1, ϕf , ϕx, ϕy). Aggregate
output is then given by
logQ(Ωt,Ωt−1) = ϕ′0 + ϕ−1f¯t−1 + (ϕf + ϕx)f¯t + ϕyyt (28)
where ϕ′0 ≡ ϕ0 + 12
(
ρ−1
ρ
)[
ϕ2f
κξ
+ ϕ
2
x
κx
+ 2ϕfϕxκx
]
. It follows that Q(Ωt,Ωt−1) is indeed log-normal,
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with
E [logQ(Ωt,Ωt−1)|ωt,Ωt−1] = ϕ′0 + ϕ−1f¯t−1 + (ϕf + ϕx)E
[
f¯t|ωt,Ωt−1
]
+ ϕyyt (29)
V ar [logQ(Ωt,Ωt−1)|ωt,Ωt−1] = (ϕf + ϕx)2
(
1
κf + κx + κy
)
(30)
where E
[
f¯t|ωt,Ωt−1
]
= κfκf+κx+κyψft−1 +
κx
κf+κx+κy
xt +
κy
κf+κx+κy
yt. Substituting these expressions
into (9) gives us
log q (ωt,Ωt−1) = const+ (1− α) f (ω) + α
(
ϕ0
′ + ϕ−1f¯t−1 + ϕyyt
)
+α(ϕf + ϕx)
(
κf
κf + κx + κy
ψft−1 +
κx
κf + κx + κy
xt +
κy
κf + κx + κy
yt
)
For this to coincide with log q (ω) = ϕ0+ϕ−1f¯t−1+ϕff+ϕxx+ϕyy for every (f, x, y), it is necessary
and sufficient that the coefficients (ϕ0, ϕ−1, ϕf , ϕx, ϕy) solve the following system:
ϕ0 = const+ αϕ′0
ϕf = 1− α
ϕx = α(ϕf + ϕx)
(
κx
κf + κx + κy
)
ϕ−1 = αϕ−1 + α(ϕf + ϕx)
(
κf
κf + κx + κy
)
ψ
ϕy = αϕy + α(ϕf + ϕx)
(
κy
κf + κx + κy
)
The unique solution to this system for (ϕ−1, ϕf , ϕx, ϕy) is the one given in the proposition; ϕ0 is
then uniquely determined from the first equation of this system along with the definition of const
and ϕ′0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The result follows by a triple limit. First, take α → 1; next, take
κy → 0; and finally, take κx → ∞. It is easy to check that this triple limit implies κ → ∞ and
R → 1. That is, the precision of the agents posterior about the fundamentals (the mean squared
forecast error) converges to zero, while the fraction of the high-frequency variation in output that
is due to noise converges to 100%.
Kalman filtering for dynamic extension. The method we use in solving this equilibrium is
similar to that found in Woodford (2003b).
State Vector and Law of Motion. We guess and verify that the relevant aggregate state variables
of the economy at time t are f¯t and logQt and thus define state vector Xt in (18) accordingly.
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Claim. The dynamics of the economy are given by the following law of motion
Xt = MXt−1 +mvvt +mεεt (31)
with
M ≡
 ψ 0
M21 M22
 ,mv ≡
 1
mv2
 ,mε ≡
 0
mε2
 . (32)
The coefficients (M21,M22,mv2,mε2) are given by
M21 = ψ (K21 +K22) (33)
M22 = ψ (1−K21 −K22) (34)
mu2 = 1− α (1−K21 −K22) (35)
mη2 = αK22 (36)
and
K ≡
 K11 K21
K21 K22

is the matrix of kalman gains, defined by
K ≡ E [(Xt − Ei,t−1 [Xt]) (zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t])′]E [(zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t]) (zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t])′]−1 (37)
We verify this claim in the following and describe the procedure for finding the fixed point.
Observation Equation. In each period t, firms and workers on island i observe vector zi,t, as
in (19), of private and public signals. In terms of the aggregate state and error terms, island i’s
observation equation takes the form
zi,t ≡
 e′1
e′1
Xt +
 1
0
 ςit +
 0
1
 εt (38)
where ej is defined as a column vector of length two where the j-th entry is 1 and all other entries
are 0.
Forecasting and Inference. Island i’s t− 1 forecast of zit is given by
Ei,t−1 [zi,t] =
 e′1
e′1
Ei,t−1 [Xt]
where Ei,t−1 [Xt] is island’s i’s t− 1 forecast of Xt. Combining this with the law of motion (31), it
follows that Ei,t−1 [Xt] = MEi,t−1 [Xt−1].
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To form minimum mean-squared-error estimates of the current state, firms and workers on each
island use the kalman filter to update their forecasts. Updating is done via
Ei,t [Xt] = Ei,t−1 [Xt] +K (zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t]) , (39)
where K is the 2×2 matrix of Kalman gains, defined in (37). Substitution of island i′s t−1 forecast
of zit into (39) gives us
Ei,t [Xt] =
I −K
 e′1
e′1
MEi,t−1 [Xt−1] +Kzi,t (40)
Let E¯t [Xt] ≡
∫
I Ei,t [Xt] di be the time t average expectation of the current state. Aggregation over
(40) implies
E¯t [Xt] =
I −K
 e′1
e′1
M E¯t−1 [Xt−1] +K ∫ zi,tdi
Finally, using the fact that aggregration over signals yields
∫
zi,tdi =
 e′1
e′1
Xt+
 0
1
 εt, it follows
that the average expectation evolves according to
E¯t [Xt] = K
 e′1
e′1
MXt−1 +
I −K
 e′1
e′1
M E¯t−1 [Xt−1] (41)
+K
 e′1
e′1
mvvt +K
 e′1
e′1
mε +
 0
1
 εt
where M ,mv,mε are given by (32).
Characterizing Aggregate Output. Local output in each island is determined by the best-response-
like condition in (17), which may be rewritten as log qi,t = (1− α) ft + αe′2Ei,t [Xt]. Aggregating
over this condition, we find that aggregate output must satisfy
logQt = (1− α) f¯t + αe′2E¯t [Xt] (42)
Substituting our expression for E¯t [Xt] from (41) into (42), gives us
logQt = [(1− α)ψ + αψ (K21 +K22)] f¯t−1 + [αM21 − αψ (K21 +K22)] E¯t−1
[
f¯t−1
]
+αM22E¯t−1 [logQt−1] + [(1− α) + α (K21 +K22)] vt + αK22εt
Moreover, rearranging condition (42), we find that E¯t [logQt] = 1α
(
logQt − (1− α) f¯t
)
. Finally,
using this condition in the above equation gives us
logQt = [(1− α)ψ + αψ (K21 +K22)−M22 (1− α)] f¯t−1 +M22 logQt−1
+ [αM21 − αψ (K21 +K22)] E¯t−1
[
f¯t−1
]
+ [1− α+ α (K21 +K22)] vt + αK22εt
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For this to coincide with the law of motion conjectured in (31) and (32) for every (f¯t−1, logQt−1, vt, εt),
it is necessary and sufficient that the coefficients (M21,M22,mv2,mε2) solve the following system:
M21 = (1− α)ψ + αψ (K21 +K22)−M22 (1− α)
mv2 = 1− α+ α (K21 +K22)
mε2 = αK22
0 = αM21 − αψ (K21 +K22)
The unique solution to this system for (M21,M22,mv2,mε2) is the one given in the proposition.
Therefore, given the kalman gains matrix K, we can uniquely identify the coefficients of the law of
motion of Xt.
Kalman Filtering. Let us define the variance-covariance matrices of forecast errors as
Σ ≡ E [(Xt − Ei,t−1 [Xt]) (Xt − Ei,t−1 [Xt])′]
V ≡ E [(Xt − Ei,t [Xt]) (Xt − Ei,t [Xt])′]
These matrices will be the same for all islands i, since their observation errors are assumed to
have the same stochastic properties. Using these matrices, we may write K as the product of two
components:
Ei
[
(Xt − Ei,t−1 [Xt]) (zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t])′
]
= Σ
[
e1 e1
]
+ σ2εmε
[
0 1
]
and
Ei
[
(zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t]) (zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t])′
]
=
 e′1
e′1
Σ [ e1 e1 ]+ σ2v
 1 0
0 0
 (43)
+σ2ε
 e′1
e′1
mε [ 0 1 ]+
 0
1
m′ε [ e1 e1 ]+
 0 0
0 1

Therefore, K is given by
K =
(
Σ
[
e1 e1
]
+ σ2εmε
[
0 1
]) (
σ2z
)−1 (44)
where σ2z ≡ Ei
[
(zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t]) (zi,t − Ei,t−1 [zi,t])′
]
is given by (43).
Finally, what remains to determine is the matrix Σ. The law of motion implies that matrices Σ
and V satisfy
Σ = MVM ′ + σ2vmvm
′
v + σ
2
εmεm
′
ε,
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In addition, the forecasting equation (40) imply these matrices must further satisfy
V = Σ−
(
Σ
[
e1 e1
]
+ σ2εmε
[
0 1
]) (
σ2z
)−1 e′1
e′1
Σ + σ2ε
 0
1
m′ε

Combining the above two equations, we obtain the stationary Ricatti Equation for Σ:
Σ = MΣM ′ −M
(
Σ
[
e1 e1
]
+ σ2εmε
[
0 1
]) (
σ2z
)−1 e′1
e′1
Σ + σ2ε
 0
1
m′ε
M ′
+σ2vmvm
′
v + σ
2
εmεm
′
ε (45)
where M , mv, mε are functions of the kalman gains matrix K, and K is itself a function of Σ
and mε. The variance-covariance matrix Σ, the kalman gains matrix K, and the law of motion
matricesM , mv, mε are thus obtained by solving the large non-linear system of equations described
by (33)-(36), (44), and (45). This system is too complicated to allow further analytical results; we
thus solve for the fixed point numerically.
Proof of Proposition 5. The planner’s problem is strictly convex, guaranteeing that its solution
is unique and is pinned down by its first-order conditions. The Lagrangian of this problem can be
written as
Λ =
∫
SΩ
[
U(Q(Ωt,Ωt−1))−
∫
Sω
1
1+S(ω)e
− 1+
θ
aq(ω,Ωt−1)
1+
θ dΩt(ω)
]
dF(Ωt|Ωt−1)
+
∫
SΩ
λ(Ωt)
[
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1)
ρ−1
ρ −
∫
Sω
q(ω,Ωt−1)
ρ−1
ρ dΩt(ω)
]
dF(Ωt|Ωt−1)
The first-order conditions with respect to Q(Ω) and q (ω) are given by the following:
U ′ (Q(Ωt,Ωt−1)) + λ(Ωt)
(
ρ− 1
ρ
)
Q(Ωt,Ωt−1)
− 1
ρ = 0 (46)∫
SΩ
[
−1
θ
S(ω)e−
1+
θ
aq(ω,Ωt−1)
1+
θ
−1 − λ(Ωt)
(
ρ− 1
ρ
)
q (ω,Ωt−1)
− 1
ρ
]
F (Ωt|ω,Ωt−1) = 0 (47)
where F (Ωt|ω,Ωt−1) denotes the posterior about Ωt (or, equivalently, about f¯t and yt) given ωt.
Restating condition (46) as λ(Ωt)
(
ρ−1
ρ
)
= −U ′ (Q(Ωt,Ωt−1))Q(Ωt,Ωt−1)
1
ρ and substituting this
into condition (47), gives condition (26), which concludes the proof.
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